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ABSTRACT 
Since 9/11, the U.S. has developed policies to counter the terrorist threat. Integral 
to those policies is preparedness. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 states that 
preparedness will include, “capacity building prevention activities such as information 
gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration related to terrorist attacks.” Despite the 
criticality of capacity building in relation to preparedness, the term is not defined. 
There has been no discussion on what capacity building means. The term is often 
equated to federal assistance or used interchangeably with capabilities and capability 
based planning. Capacity building strategies, however, are distinct and link into wider 
economic, political, and societal issues. Despite capacity building’s criticality to 
preparedness and sustainment, various or ambiguous interpretations will translate to 
differences in strategic priorities. This thesis will examine the existing strategies to 
determine the linkage between capacity building, preparedness, sustainment, capability, 
capability based planning, and the envisioned end-state. It will also address sustainment 
issues and homeland security costs based on differing capacity building interpretations. 
The end product is a capacity building definition that captures the costs and variables 
with building and sustaining capabilities. This thesis will also demonstrate how capacity 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................2 
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE .........................................................2 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ................................................................2 
E. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE..................................................3 
F. HYPOTHESIS................................................................................................15 
G. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES...........................................................16 
II. STRATEGIC DECISIONS: THE U.S. ARMY’S 90 DIVISION GAMBLE & 
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 ...................................17 
A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................17 
B. THE 90 DIVISION GAMBLE......................................................................18 
1. Background ........................................................................................18 
2. The Strategic Decision .......................................................................20 
3. Decision Success .................................................................................22 
4. Decision Characteristics ....................................................................24 
C. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 .......................26 
1. Background ........................................................................................26 
2. The Strategic Decision .......................................................................28 
3. Decision Success .................................................................................29 
4. Decision Characteristics ....................................................................31 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32 
III. FOCUSING ON KEY HOMELAND SECURITY SYSTEMS: 
CHALLENGES TO THE LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK ...............35 
A. LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK ................................................35 
1. Mission and Scope..............................................................................35 
2. Laboratory Response Network: Organization................................36 
3. Status of Public Health and Laboratory Response Network 
prior to the 2001 Anthrax Attacks ...................................................39 
B. 2001 ANTHRAX ATTACKS........................................................................42 
1. Bacillus Anthracis...............................................................................42 
2. Physical Laboratory Limitations during the 2001 Anthrax 
Incidents..............................................................................................43 
3. Strategic Public Health Response Limitations ................................47 
C. LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK: CAPACITY BUILDING?..48 
1. Implications ........................................................................................48 
2. Challenges...........................................................................................49 
a. Nature of Costs........................................................................49 
b. Political Acceptability .............................................................53 
 viii
IV. FOCUSING ON KEY HOMELAND SECURITY PROGAMS: THE 
REVAMPING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S 
GRANT PROGRAM.................................................................................................57 
A. THE DHS GRANT PROGRAM ..................................................................57 
1. Background ........................................................................................57 
2. Purpose and Organization of Grants ...............................................58 
3. The Evolution and Consequences of the Federal Grant System ...61 
B. THE DHS GRANT SYSTEM SINCE 9/11..................................................66 
1. Strategic Guidance.............................................................................66 
2. Challenges to the DHS Grant Program ...........................................69 
3. DHS and Preparedness Funding ......................................................73 
C. THE DHS GRANT SYSTEM: CAPACITY BUILDING? ........................78 
1. Implications ........................................................................................78 
2. Challenges...........................................................................................79 
a. Nature of Costs........................................................................79 
b. Political Acceptability .............................................................80 
V. FOCUSING ON KEY HOMELAND SECURITY MANNING ISSUES: THE 
NECESSITY FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER 
TRAINING INITIATIVES.......................................................................................83 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
TRAINING .....................................................................................................83 
1. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: A Key 
Example ..............................................................................................83 
2. Homeland Security Professional Development and Training 
Challenges...........................................................................................86 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY MANNING ISSUES: STRATEGIC 
CONSIDERATIONS .....................................................................................89 
1. Mechanisms ........................................................................................89 
2. Measuring Progress ...........................................................................92 
C. HOMELAND SECURITY MANNING ISSUES: CAPACITY 
BUILDING? ...................................................................................................96 
1. Implications ........................................................................................96 
2. Challenges...........................................................................................97 
a. Nature of Costs........................................................................97 
b. Political Acceptability .............................................................98 
VI. CONCLUSION: CAPACITY BUILDING AND IDENTIFYING THE END-
STATE ......................................................................................................................101 
A. CAPACITY BUILDING: RELATIONSHIP TO HOMELAND 
SECURITY...................................................................................................101 
1. Capacity Building and the Envisioned End-state: Linkages .......101 
2. Capacity Building versus Capability Based Approaches .............105 
B. CAPACITY BUILDING: INVESTING FOR THE LONG-TERM .......107 
1. Capacity Assessment: Initial Point of Departure..........................107 
2. Capacity Cushion: How Much is Enough?.....................................109 
 ix
3. Developing Capacity Building Concepts: Envisioning the End-
State...................................................................................................110 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................113 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Capacity Building and Capability Relationship.................................................9 
Figure 2. Pyramid of Public Health Preparedness (After the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Public Health’s Insfrastructure: A Status Report) ...44 
Figure 3. New York City Laboratory Comparison (From Michael B. Heller’s 
Laboratory Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism) ..............................................46 
Figure 4. Selected Consolidated Terrorism Preparedness Programs Within the 
Office for Domestic Preparedness (From Congressional Research Service, 
First Responder Grant Formulas: The 9/11 Recommendation and other 
Options for Congressional Action) ..................................................................60 
Figure 5. Trend in the Number of Federal Grant Programs to State and Local 
Governments (From General Accountability Office, Grant System 
Continues to be Highly Fragmented)...............................................................63 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank God for giving me the guidance and perseverance to apply 
for and complete this program. It has been a truly enriching experience. I would also like 
to thank my thesis advisors, Bob Bach and Chris Bellavita, for all their invaluable 
assistance in helping me craft and articulate the central premise of this thesis into a 
workable argument. My deepest appreciation also goes to Lauren Wollman for all her 
invaluable insight in providing guidance and structure to my non-structured and non-
linear approach to tackling a large issue. 
I am extremely appreciative of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
faculty and administrative staffs. They are a great group of professionals who truly 
support their students and ensure they are best postured for success. I must also recognize 
the great women and men of my class. I have learned a great deal from them during the 
course of this program. My successful participation in this program would also have not 
been possible without the mentorship of John Bruder, the great support of my supervisor, 
Rich Allison, and the rest of my collection management cohorts. Little do they know the 
influence that our homeland security discussions have had to this thesis. Lastly, this 
program would not have been possible without the loving support of my wife Maria and 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has embarked on the development of homeland 
security strategies and policies to counter the terrorist threat — a threat projected to exist 
over the long-term. Integral to preparing the nation in meeting this threat, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 8 (National Preparedness) states that assistance 
will include measures that support “capacity building prevention activities such as 
information gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration related to terrorist 
attacks.”1 The underlying principle is the concept that capacity building is the key 
component for mobilizing and expanding systems in terms of their scope, sustaining 
homeland security efforts over time, and building resiliency into mechanisms that support 
detection, deterrence, and other homeland security missions. Federal assistance activities 
are also aimed at developing self-sustainment efforts at state and local jurisdictions. 
Implicit to an effective national preparedness program is the need for an effective 
capacity building strategy. These efforts define strategic homeland security actions, 
outline the measures necessary to achieve preparedness, and define a way ahead to 
achieve these goals. 
Despite the criticality of capacity building efforts in relation to national 
preparedness, the term capacity building is not defined. It is not defined in any homeland 
security related strategy, document, or plan. Additionally, despite extensive governmental 
reorganization, realignment of state and local priorities, increased funding for homeland 
security initiatives, and extensive congressional testimony, there has been very little 
discussion on what capacity building means and what, if any, relationship exists between 
capacity building and the current focus on developing capabilities through capabilities 
based planning. As a result, despite its criticality to long-term preparedness and 
sustainment, capacity building’s various or ambiguous interpretations will translate to 
differences in budget priorities and key tasks. This will lead to an increasingly disjointed 
and unfocused homeland security approach — particularly over the long-term.                                                  
1 Office of the President, Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directive, HSPD-8: National 
Preparedness (Washington, DC: GPO, December 17, 2003), 3; https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/ 
docs/whitehouse/nps05-121803-02.pdf (accessed on October 15, 2005). 
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This thesis will examine the existing national strategy and presidential directives 
to determine the linkage, if any, between capacity building measures, national 
preparedness and sustainment. It will also distinguish capacity building concepts from the 
focus on capabilities and capability-based planning. Additionally, this thesis will explore 
the sustainment issues and associated costs of homeland security over the long-term 
based on differing capacity building interpretations. The end product is a capacity 
building definition that better captures the costs and variables with building and 
sustaining capabilities. This thesis will also demonstrate how capacity building measures 
serves as the foundational premise for a sound homeland security strategic plan. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will examine how capacity building measures address the challenges 
of sustaining homeland security and defense initiatives over the long-term. It will also 
examine what capacity building means in relation to the overall National Strategy for 
Homeland Security and how the term should be defined. Lastly, this research project will 
look at the relationship between capabilities, capacity building, sustainment, and 
preparedness. 
 
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is threefold; to determine the importance of 
capacity building concepts as they relate to homeland security, to distinguish capacity 
building concepts versus capability based planning, and to examine the differing costs 
associated with different capacity building terms. The answers to this research will 
highlight the differences in costs associated with differing capacity building terms and 
how they relate to sustaining homeland security over the long-term. Lastly, this research 
will highlight the importance of embedding and factoring capacity building concepts at 
the onset of any strategic homeland security planning initiative. 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The primary focus of this thesis will address how the lack of a capacity building 
definition translates to fundamental differences in interpretations. The underlying premise 
3 
is that differences in interpretation translate into differences in budget allocations, 
funding, and priorities. Over the long-term, these differences will result in a disjointed 
approach and an increasingly unfocused overarching strategy — directly affecting the 
ability to sustain the homeland security effort. The inability to effectively sustain 
homeland security, coupled with the continued threat posed by terrorism, the need to 
provide varying levels of domestic preparedness capabilities, flat budgetary constraints, 
and competing national interests will result in significant opportunity costs. 
The research objectives are to derive some capacity building definitions by 
examining various homeland security issues to demonstrate how strategic planners can 
derive widely different interpretations on capacity building. The research will also 
demonstrate how each interpretation can lead to widely different budget priorities and 
tasks — especially when looking at these interpretations at the strategic level and over a 
long-term. The end result is to derive a capacity building definition and offer 
recommendations to homeland security strategic planners that identify and develop 
capacity building concepts to improve plans for sustaining homeland security strategies 
and operations over the long-term. These capacity building concepts will demonstrate the 
sustainment gaps and necessary changes to current homeland security strategies. In the 
end, this thesis will highlight the need for identifying capacity building at the onset to 
ensure the necessary means are considered for sustaining homeland security and 
achieving a desired end-state. 
 
E. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
There have been numerous national strategy documents and presidential 
directives that address Homeland security and defense issues. Each of these documents 
recognizes the clear threat of terrorism to the United States. They also highlight several 
strategic objectives, critical mission areas, foundational factors, and key supporting 
elements. Despite the many common themes that exist in these documents, there is very 
little language on the capacity it takes and the capacity building measures that are 
necessary to sustain homeland security over a protracted time period. For example, the 
National Security Strategy for Homeland Security identifies six critical mission areas 
integral to the successful implementation of the strategy. They are Intelligence and 
4 
Warning, Border and Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting 
Critical Infrastructure, Defending against Catastrophic Threats, and Emergency 
Preparedness and Response.2 In contrast, there is very little discussion on building the 
necessary capacity to sustain these efforts. 
A review of first tier documentation — national strategies and directives — is 
necessary to determine if a lack of definition exists between the strategy and capacity 
building. An examination of the National Security Strategy, National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 (National 
Preparedness), and Department of Defense’s (DoD) Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support reveals that the term capacity building is not defined. The National Security 
Strategy recognizes the need to build capacity for developing nations as part of a wider 
diplomatic and democratic implementation effort.3 The specific homeland security 
documents do address the need to develop surge capacity and how improvements in 
command and control will improve the government’s capacity to respond to terrorist 
events, but there is no philosophical underpinning that discusses how generic capacities 
can be improved or developed within a larger political, economic, or societal context to 
sustain any of these initiatives over a long period of time. 
A review of second and third tier documentation — the underlying business plans 
and goals that support a strategy — is another way to determine if capacity building 
measures fit under the overall homeland security approach. Second and third tier 
documents exist to underpin a national strategy to address in greater detail the “how we 
plan to get there” aspect of a strategy. These documents ideally serve to “obtain the most 
from our limited national resources (means), [to] determine where we want to go 
(objectives) and how we plan to get there (strategy).”4 In effect, second and third tier 
documentation contained in strategic business plans, goals, and guidance should provide 
                                                 
2 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington DC: GPO, 
2002), viii-x; http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf (accessed on December 15, 
2005). 
3 Office of the President, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: GPO, 
March 2006), 33; https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps08-031606-01.pdf (accessed on 
December 27, 2006). 
4 Richard M. Lloyd et al., eds., Strategy and Force Planning, 2d ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, 1997), 4. 
5 
greater detail into the underlying capacity building measures that are necessary — 
whether through expanding, mobilizing, or sustaining the mechanisms that support varied 
homeland security objectives — to ensure that the maximum benefit is gained through 
limited national resources. These documents should reconcile the envisioned strategy 
with the capacity building measures that are necessary to support the strategy. 
A review of this documentation provides limited interpretation. The National 
Preparedness Goal states that, “the TCL [Target Capabilities List] provides guidance on 
the capabilities and risk-based target levels that civilian Federal, State, local, and tribal 
entities will need to achieve and sustain to realize the vision for the National 
Preparedness Goal.”5 The document also identifies a capability as: 
. . . the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from the 
performance of  one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and 
performance standards. A capability may be delivered with any 
combination of properly planned, organized, trained, and exercised 
personnel that achieves the intended outcome.6 
 
Implicit in this definition is the need to resource and sustain a targeted capability and to 
support its performance for executing a critical task — a discretely focused activity or 
activities that are necessary “to achieving success in a homeland security mission for a 
major event to prevent occurrence, to minimize loss of life and serious injuries, or to 
mitigate significant property damage.”7 These capabilities and critical tasks are aligned to 
support specific objectives, such as the fulfillment of specific public health, emergency 
management, or law enforcement functions. These objectives are aligned to target 
specific mission areas to prevent occurrence, minimize loss of life, or mitigate damage. 
The scope and use of capabilities are more narrowly focused on the accomplishment of 
the mission. 
                                                 
5 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: GPO, December 
2005), D-3; https://www.hsdl.org/ homesec/docs/dhs/nps03-010306-02.pdf (accessed on March 5, 2006). 
6 Ibid., A-1. See Appendix A: Terms and Definitions 
7 Ibid., A-1. 
6 
Capability based planning offers a methodology to produce and manage 
capabilities within the framework of the mission, risk, and uncertainty. The formal 
definition of capability based planning is: 
. . . planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide 
range of challenges while working within an economic framework that 
necessitates prioritization and choice.8 
 
Under this methodology, capabilities are produced under the framework of uncertainty to 
increase preparedness. For homeland security, these capabilities are aligned against the 
15 planning scenarios contained in the National Preparedness Goal. Although priorities 
and choices are considered, they are considered only under the narrow confines of 
planning scenarios and discrete mission sets. 
A capability, however, once expended needs to be replaced. It must also be 
replaced due to obsolescence. The foundational capacities that produce capabilities — 
whether in terms of trained personnel or equipment — are focused on ensuring that 
sufficient numbers of these items are resourced and postured to support and sustain these 
capabilities over the long-term. While the document acknowledges the need to sustain a 
targeted capability, it does not address the wider capacity issues and addresses the 
concept of capacity building only by restating the language contained in HSPD-8.9 
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) — the complement to the National 
Preparedness Goal — seeks to identify the capabilities necessary to achieve the national 
goal. The TCL further states that “preparedness measures assess preparedness actions 
taken before an incident to build the capacity to achieve the capability outcome. These 
measures relate to the development of plans, procedures, protocols, authorities, training, 
specialized equipment and systems, and how often they are updated and exercised.”10 In 
essence, the TCL considers the need for a capacity assessment before building a 
capability outcome. It does not consider, however, the scope, focus, or methodology of 
                                                 
8 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, D-1. See Appendix D of the 
National Preparedness Goal for an overview of capability based planning. 
9 Ibid., v. 
10 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List (TCL): A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: GPO, August 2006), 10; https://www.hsdl.org/homesec 
/docs/dhs/nps08-080706-01.pdf (accessed on April 12, 2006). 
7 
what a capacity assessment entails. Lastly, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Strategic Plan addresses capacity only in terms of surge and logistical capacities to 
strengthen response readiness.11 It does not address capacity in terms of larger 
mobilization or sustainment. In short, there is no discussion on the necessary measures to 
improve, support, expand, or sustain these capacities. 
By implication, an assessment of the National Preparedness Goal, its 
complementary TCL, and other plans does indicate a tenuous relationship between the 
term capability and the concept of capacity building. Capability and capability-based 
planning are terms that seemingly address the issues of preparedness, capacity, and 
sustainment. They are focused on developing and maintaining capabilities to support 
discrete mission objectives. These documents do not, however, describe the strategic 
actions necessary to assess, develop, or articulate the underlying issues that address a 
needed capacity. There is also no language on the capacity of a system, or systems, that 
are necessary or critical to sustaining homeland security capabilities over the long-term. 
In other words, a relationship exists between the achievement of a capability and the 
underlying capacity necessary to achieve that capability. The philosophies that tie the 
necessary capacity building measures or capacity assessments to achieve the stated 
capability objectives, however, do not exist. The two concepts, while related, are not 
interchangeable. Simply put, a capability is focused on the achievement of a measurable 
and specific mission task or tasks. A capacity is focused on the wider issues that 
resources, produces, and sustains a wide variety of interrelated capabilities. There is no 
underlying discussion on the relationship between the two concepts. 
A concrete example can provide greater clarity. Other fields — particularly with 
assistance strategies used by Non-governmental Organizations and educational 
development efforts — utilize capacity building concepts to describe their actions at 
promoting and fostering sustainable growth. For example, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development recognizes the term capacity development in its approach 
to developing strategies that assist impoverished nations. The term: 
                                                 
11 Department of Homeland Security, Securing the Homeland – U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan (Washington DC: GPO, 2004), 28; http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf (accessed on March 5, 2006). 
8 
. . . is understood as the process whereby people, organizations and society 
as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over 
time. The phrase capacity development is used advisedly in preference to 
the traditional capacity building. The “building” metaphor suggests a 
process starting with a plain surface and involving the step-by-step 
erection of a new structure, based on a preconceived design.12 
 
Whether capacity development or capacity building, the term is used with a broader 
application to describe the linkages between governance, organizations, and society to 
initiate sustainable growth over time. For homeland security, this would mean that 
building a capacity to support individual mission components should incorporate a wider 
and strategic approach to building sustainable and meaningful change. It would also 
indicate that the concept of capacity building has wider organizational and societal 
implications than the development of a discrete capability — activities that must be 
performed through a combination of resources to achieve a goal.13 Capacity building 
focuses on wider strategic actions that incorporate various aspects of an environment — 
governance, economics, or societal factors to achieve sustainable growth. Capability 
based planning, which offers a methodology to focus on the means to counter a challenge 
through use of scenarios, cost analysis, and resource development is focused on 
important, but a more specific set of issues aimed at accomplishing a discrete mission set. 
Conversely, a capacity building strategy seeks to identify, expand, and sustain the 
foundational mechanisms that support and maintain capabilities over the long-term. A 
capacity building approach is more strategic in nature and is linked to the wider 
economic, political, and societal forces that relate to the strategy. For example, there 
might be an identified capability to have certain numbers of border patrol agents per 
sector to support the Border and Transportation Security mission contained in the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security. The wider capacity building issue centers on 
how many border patrol agents are required to support all the sector requirements and  
 
                                                 
12 Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, “The Challenge of Capacity 
Development: Working Towards Good Practice,” DAC Network on Governance (February 14, 2006), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/36/36326495.pdf (accessed on October 1, 2006), 9. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List, 10. To paraphrase the definition of 
capability. 
9 
whether the current entry training program for agents can support these macro-level tasks 
given agent rotation cycles, end-to-end career development initiatives, and attrition due to 
retirements. 
Lastly, congressional testimony, public debate, recommendations from think-
tanks and policy assessment institutes yield very little literature on the subject of capacity 
building, what the term means, and how it relates to the overall homeland security 
strategy. In essence, a gap exists between the envisioned end-state and the capabilities 
contained in the national strategic documents, directives, and plans and what these 
documents seek to accomplish versus the tangible and necessary capacity building 
measures that accomplish these goals within the wider aspects of mobilization and 
sustainment and how they relate to political, economic, or societal issues. 
 
Figure 1.   Capacity Building and Capability Relationship 
 
As illustrated in the above figure, the various strategic documents, directives, and 
plans clearly articulate the need for various capabilities to support the six mission sets 
contained in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. A clear linkage exists between 
the National Preparedness Goal and the complementary Target Capabilities List to 
support the overarching strategy and its mission areas in terms of capabilities and 
capability-based planning. The underlying capacity building philosophies and concepts 
that link into capability-based planning initiatives, however, do not exist. 
10 
Despite the lack of definition, public debate, or clear linkages between capacity 
building and national strategy, there have been instances in the past of decisions that 
mobilized the nation in terms of their scope and in the underlying capacities that were 
sustained through strategic efforts and national focus. More importantly, the need to 
develop and sustain capacities was recognized as a key element to understanding the 
trade-off decisions and the opportunity costs involved to achieving a well and clear idea 
of success. An understanding of the strategic assumptions and the mechanisms necessary 
to tie practical capacity building efforts to national strategy were also integral aspects to 
the success of these decisions. For example, during World War Two, initial manpower 
studies concluded that the United States would require 200 Army divisions to defeat the 
Axis powers. By 1943, the Army leadership was faced with the stark realities that were 
manifested by competing manpower and resource commitments. Facing the challenges of 
staffing, manning, resourcing, training, equipping, and planning for these forces coupled 
with the limitations of the nation’s industrial base and the changing strategic assumptions 
concerning the threat, it was clear that the 200 division estimate was unsustainable. After 
examining the national strategy, competing requirements, and future estimates, General 
Marshall and his advisors concluded that the Army would require 90 divisions. Known as 
the “90 Division Gamble,” General Marshall’s assessment of various trade-offs, 
underlying capacities, and vision during the middle of World War II allowed the United 
States to meet competing commitments and decisively win the war.14 
Another decision, one initiated during peacetime, occurred in the 1950s as a result 
of the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. President Eisenhower 
recognized that the United States and the Soviet Union would engage in the “space race.” 
He also recognized that the “space race” would require a significant commitment on the 
part of the nation to sustain a lengthy and focused effort. One aspect of his policy was to 
enact the National Defense Education Act, whose purpose was to improve the level of 
scientific and technical education in U.S. universities.15 Establishing a strategic policy 
that addressed a foundational element of society improved the ability of the United States 
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to develop a large technological base to sustain its efforts in space. These efforts were 
further sustained through the creation of various scientific and research related 
organizations to foster collaboration. As highlighted in the National Defense Education 
and Innovation Initiative, a report recommending a similar government investment to the 
nation’s present education system, the Eisenhower initiative resulted in a four-fold 
increase in the number of U.S. Nobel prize science winners in the latter part of the 
twentieth century.16 
These historical examples reveal several points. First, these decisions were indeed 
strategic in nature. They were initiated at the highest level of government as part of a 
larger and focused strategy, whether to defeat the global Axis threat or building the 
nation’s educational foundation to overcome the Soviets in space. Second, these 
decisions were in direct response to a national-level threat and were quickly initiated to 
galvanize the nation’s efforts and commit its resources on a strategic scale to meet the 
strategy’s goal. Also of note, General Marshall’s decision to overturn the Army’s earlier 
manpower assessment early in the war represents a significant strategic decision point. 
Third, these decisions were focused on an identifiable end-state — defeating the Axis and 
overcoming the Soviets. Lastly, these decisions also recognized the importance to sustain 
and focus a wider set of capacity related actions to produce, in essence, the sufficient 
capabilities necessary to meet the strategy’s objectives. 
Despite today’s lack of published literature or definition on capacity building 
measures related to homeland security whether in first, second, and third tier homeland 
security documents — and considering the past historical examples — there are some 
contemporary derivations for the term by examining three related homeland security 
issues. In the fall of 2001, the U.S. was faced with the reality of a bioterrorist attack. 
Several envelopes containing traces of anthrax were mailed to congressional officials and 
the media. This attack affected twenty-two people and caused five deaths.17 Although far 
from perfect, it was acknowledged that the medical community’s response to this incident                                                  
16 Association of American Universities (AAU), National Defense Education and Innovation 
Initiative: Meeting America’s Economic and Security Challenges in the 21st Century (New York: AAU, 
January 2006), 13; http://www.aau.edu/reports/NDEII.pdf (accessed on September 16, 2006), 13. 
17 United States General Accountability Office, Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax 
Incidents of 2001, GAO 04-152 (Washington, DC: October 10, 2003), 14; http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d05251.pdf (accessed on October 29, 2005). 
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was generally effective in terms of communications and command and control. The 
glaring lesson from this incident was the extent that the medical workforce and the 
Laboratory Response Network were overwhelmed. In other words, “the response capacity 
was strained and would have been difficult to sustain.”18 More importantly, it highlighted 
how a relatively unsophisticated attack using a benign method of delivery could paralyze 
the nation’s laboratory response and epidemiological capability. As a result of this attack 
and its psychological and economic impact, one clear focus area articulated in the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security is the necessity to plan for and build a capacity 
— in terms of physical investment — to respond to a weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD) attack.19 
Another issue is the criticism from state and local officials on the DHS’ 
Homeland Security Grant Program. A recent study stated that “many of the fundamental 
problems in managing federal grants were the direct result of the proliferation of federal 
assistance programs and the fragmentation of responsibility among different federal 
departments and agencies.”20 The multiplicity of programs and the diffusion of 
responsibilities have created innumerable inefficiencies to successfully implementing the 
homeland security grant process. In other words, the organizational capacity, or in this 
case — incapacity, of the DHS’ grant program have led to inefficiencies that have a 
direct impact on the ability of state and local jurisdictions to build homeland security 
capacity. The implication is that program reforms — in terms of organizational capacity 
— are necessary to implement capacity building measures. 
The last issue deals with a recent study from the National Academy of Public 
Administration. The study dealt with the top issues of advancing homeland security. 
Acknowledged in the study was the challenge before the DHS in “creating a true national 
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approach to homeland security.”21 Among the top issues identified in the study were the 
lack of common understanding from public officials on homeland security related 
functions and the unpredictable nature of critical incidents. More importantly, the study 
identified the need to establish protocols in advance, the shortfalls in planning 
capabilities due to training shortfalls, and the lack of homeland security capacity in some 
states and municipalities due to lack of trained specialists. The consistent thread among 
these themes is the lack of training, education, awareness, and necessary skills to 
successfully implement homeland security initiatives. This study would imply that 
capacity building measures are necessary — in terms of manning and training — to 
improve human capital programs. Homeland security training should be a top priority and 
is crucial to the long-term success of any effort.22 
The present problem when examining these issues is that the term capacity 
building can be interpreted in widely divergent ways. These differences in the 
understanding of the term can result in tangible differences in strategic priorities, key 
tasks, and budget allocations. For instance, homeland security capacity building efforts 
could be interpreted in the following manner: 
• The U.S. government will engage in capacity building measures by 
increasing investments in specific areas to expand or recapitalize critical 
systems that support homeland security efforts — in this case, the 
Laboratory Response Network. 
• The U.S. government will engage in capacity building measures to 
improve the organizational capacity of key program areas — the DHS’s 
grant program — to increase efficiency and streamline critical processes 
that support homeland security. 
• The U.S. government will engage in capacity building measures to 
improve and expand homeland security training and planning skills to 
understand, prevent, and respond to homeland security threats. 
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Although capacity building is used in each example, the term implies significant 
differences. The first definition implies the expansion of an area that is deemed critical in 
terms of its importance and continuity to fulfilling the homeland security mission. It 
implies building or expanding capital improvements to improve the capacity of a system. 
The second implies improving the efficiency of a key program or system to improve its 
capacity in meeting the nation’s homeland security needs. The last definition is centered 
on a social context to expand and improve homeland security training venues and 
opportunities to equip people with the necessary skills to understand, prevent, and 
respond to a threat. 
Absence of definition leads to differences in interpretation, particularly in an area 
as nascent as homeland security. In practical terms, these differences can lead to 
differences in strategic priorities, key tasks, and budget allocations. A cursory look at 
these differences reveals a possible cost categorization of front-loaded verses distributed 
costs. Physical improvements and investment to critical systems and training 
opportunities imply front-loaded costs versus reforming key programs, which may be 
more distributive in nature. It also highlights opportunity costs over the long-term. For 
example, in 2003, the public became aware that the United States relied on a fragile 
system to procure flu vaccines. A homeland security planner could identify this as a 
strategic and critical issue and recommend the expansion and improvement of the 
“vaccine” infrastructure to improve resiliency.23 There are just as valid arguments for 
other capacity building interpretations, such as transforming intelligence to training first 
responders through education and training. The point is that each alternative comes with 
different types of costs. The expansion of the nation’s Laboratory Response Network 
requires significant front loaded costs and investment in lab testing capacity, surveillance 
detection capabilities, and personnel. Additionally, if improvements to the network were 
identified as a strategic priority and significant investments were applied to improving 
this system, the realization of these improvements would still be many years into the 
future. Conversely, reforming existing programs such as the DHS grant program may 
                                                 
23 United States General Accountability Office, Flu Vaccine: Recent Supply Shortages Underscore 
Ongoing Challenges, GAO-05-177T (Washington, DC: November 18, 2004), 4; www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
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address immediate improvements to organizational capacity, however, may not address 
future needs if the fundamental capacity gaps that are necessary to support targeted 
capabilities are not considered. These decisions represent opportunity costs. Committing 
to develop a strategic capacity with significant front-loaded costs also means that those 
resources cannot be committed to something else. Defining capacity building — 
particularly as it relates to programs, funding, and opportunity costs — would provide 
greater granularity and coherence to the overall strategy, identify critical decision points, 
and bring forth fundamental sustainment considerations. 
 
F. HYPOTHESIS 
Since 9/11 and the nation’s emphasis on homeland security, the term capacity 
building has not been defined. As such, it is subject to differing interpretations, which 
have significant consequences to overall homeland security sustainment efforts. Despite 
its lack of definition, the language contained in HSPD-8 indicates that the concept of 
capacity building is a central premise to sustaining homeland security preparedness. The 
concept of capacity building also serves as an integral component to sustaining 
preparedness efforts over the long-term. By not defining capacity building, different 
interpretations will lead to increasing ambiguity in the use of the term, such as equating 
capacity building concepts with capabilities-based planning. These differences in 
interpretation will result in two consequences. First, leaders will fail to consider the 
impact and differences in costs, whether they are captured in terms of monetary or 
opportunity costs. The determination of these types of costs represents strategic decision 
points that directly affect the ability to sustain homeland security efforts over the long-
term and hence, are critical to strategic planning. Second, strategic planners will fail to 
consider the wider implications of capacity building issues as they relate to the 
development of capabilities and sustainment. The focus on attaining target levels of 
capability centered on discrete mission tasks will overlook the competition from other 




G. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The methodology for this thesis centers on a policy options analysis based on 
events and studies that have a direct relevance to homeland security and that reveal 
differing interpretations of capacity building. These interpretations will be analyzed in 
terms of their scope and how they fit in terms of time and purpose relative to the 
overarching homeland security strategies. The intent is to demonstrate how strategic 
policy can drift, become increasingly unfocused over time, and result in significant 
opportunity costs. The initial intent of this research is to utilize documentation that 
addresses the 2001 Anthrax incident, the DHS Grant Program, and First Responder 
Training to derive different capacity building definitions and demonstrate the different 
decisions and costs associated with adopting those definitions. 
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II. STRATEGIC DECISIONS: THE U.S. ARMY’S 90 DIVISION 
GAMBLE & THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 
A. BACKGROUND 
The challenges posed to national defense issues, whether in the Second World 
War or the Cold War, are similar in many respects to 9/11. In all instances, these events 
prompted a fundamental redefinition of security. The threats posed by the Axis, the 
Soviets, or Islamic terrorism also led to global commitments and strategies as well as 
immediate implications for defending the homeland. There were also wider economic and 
societal aspects. Federal involvement in the U.S. economy to sustain global commitments 
increased as a result of the Second World War and the Cold War. Although 9/11 did not 
have a long lasting effect on the U.S. economy, federal involvement increased in specific 
economic sectors — particularly in securing vulnerable commercial transportation 
networks such as the airline industry.24 These events also redefined the U.S. society’s 
view of its standing in the world. Isolationism ceased to be a fundamental political and 
societal factor after Pearl Harbor. The Cold War crystallized the differences between the 
Communist eastern bloc and the “free” west. Although obscured by the present 
differences over U.S. policies in Iraq, 9/11 brought forth the transnational nature of 
Islamic terrorism and the necessity to combat and mitigate its effects. 
The decisions made by General Marshall and President Eisenhower offer some 
insight on how their strategic implementation to counter a threat related to capacity 
building initiatives. In both of these instances, it was recognized that the United States 
faced considerable challenges and obstacles. For General Marshall, the Axis powers were 
at their height during World War II. By 1943, they had conquered most of Europe and the 
Pacific, were pressing into the Soviet Union, the Suez Canal, and threatening Australia. 
For President Eisenhower, it was not only the realization that the Soviet Union had beat 
the United States to outer space, but also that satellites could revolutionize vital areas 
such as intelligence gathering, communications, and weaponizing space. 
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The challenges in both these instances were daunting. In the case of General 
Marshall, it was the fielding of sufficient Army divisions — essentially capabilities — 
with requisite manpower and equipment to overcome the Axis powers. He also initiated a 
significant reduction from the previous manpower estimate; hence the 90 Division 
Gamble. At the time, this reassessment was also cause for significant political concern. 
There were also significant military requirements in other areas that were competing for 
limited national resources — the need to build sufficient naval capabilities to project 
forces from the homeland, the development of strategic air capabilities, and the expansion 
of nation’s industrial base to support wartime needs. 
President Eisenhower faced a different challenge — a national threat during a 
period of peace and relative normalcy. Although the launching of Sputnik was a blow to 
the national prestige, the real challenge was not necessarily the crisis of character. It was 
the realization that the nation was falling further behind in scientific research and 
development.25 Sputnik represented a Soviet strategic move that would change the 
fundamental nature of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War confrontation and give the Soviets an 
enormous asymmetric advantage. The challenge in this case was to develop or build 
intellectual capacity at a strategic level to create advances and ensure continued U.S. 
viability in space. For both General Marshall and President Eisenhower, the threats posed 
to the nation were real and with significant strategic implications to the country. 
 
B. THE 90 DIVISION GAMBLE 
1. Background 
The Second World War was truly global in nature. It contained multiple fronts 
and spanned across great land masses and stretches of water. In the beginning of 1941, 
the Western democracies, ill prepared prior to the war, faced dire circumstances. France 
was quickly overrun in 1940; Great Britain faced Germany alone in Europe; and the 
Roosevelt administration faced an isolationist mindset in the United States. In terms of 
actual preparedness, the U.S. Army possessed approximately 190,000 soldiers not 
                                                 
25 Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (London: Greenwood Press, 1981), 19. 
19 
organized in any meaningful division structure and practically no air force.26 The Axis 
powers were extending into the Mediterranean Sea, taking advantage of Britain’s 
dependence on the Atlantic sea-lanes by increasing its U-boat campaigns, and advancing 
into Southeast Asia to secure vital raw materials while advancing towards India and 
Australia. 
After the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the United States and Great 
Britain moved quickly and decisively to establish overarching goals and a commensurate 
strategy to meet them. The Arcadia Conference — from December 22, 1941 to January 
14, 1942 and consisting of the highest Anglo-American leadership — set the basic outline 
for the remainder of the war.27 The Allies agreed to defeat Germany first, allocate raw 
materials and control shipping through joint planning, develop a Combined Chiefs of 
Staff committee system to develop strategy, and promote cooperation between military 
services.28 Already recognized by the Allied leadership, “the role of America was from 
first to last to serve as the ‘arsenal of Democracy’ with a rapidly growing weight of 
material power that they [the Axis] could not hope to match.”29 The expansion and 
preservation of industrial capacity was in essence the foundation of the Allied advantage. 
Behind the sweeping strategy that would have to support global requirements lay 
the practical and difficult challenges of how to mobilize, what to produce, and how to 
sequence production methods to support the strategy. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 
General George C. Marshall and his planners estimated in 1941 that the U.S. Army 
would require 213 divisions to defeat the Axis. Known as the Victory Program, these 
estimates assumed that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American 
powers would have to advance into the Continent to defeat Germany on their own.30 
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There were several challenges with the Victory Program. First, the United States 
had to essentially create the division structure from scratch. Prior to the war, the U.S. 
Army was aligned in smaller regimental formations scattered throughout the country and 
its possessions. Division training would require a more complex staff structure and 
training system to integrate various combat and support capabilities — infantry, artillery, 
supply, engineering, and others — into an effective fighting force. Additionally, the time 
to train raw recruits and transform them into an integrated and capable division was one 
year.31 Second, there was a total shortfall in equipment.32 Competing requirements from 
other military services and Allies made realistic training with actual equipment 
unrealistic. Lastly, there was little existing officer experience in the U.S. military.33 The 
U.S. Army had drawn down significantly after World War I and the military profession 
was not highly regarded in American society. 
General Marshall recognized that the Victory Program was unrealistic and 
unsustainable. The issue centered on integrating the U.S. Army’s manpower and resource 
requirements with all the other competing interests while maintaining a productive war 
economy — the critical component for the Allies. The Allies had recognized from the 
beginning “that the single greatest tangible asset the United States brought to the 
coalition in World War II was the productive capacity of its industry.”34 General 
Marshall ultimately established the U.S. Army’s manpower ceiling at 90 divisions 
causing considerable concern and unrest in Congress.35 Essentially, by 1943, the United 
States ceased to mobilize above a prescribed manpower ceiling — two years before the 
end of the war. This decision was the basis of the “90-Division Gamble.” 
 
2. The Strategic Decision 
General Marshall’s decision to set the manpower ceiling at 90 Divisions was not 
made without basis. The challenges to manning, training, and equipping 90 Divisions 
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involved numerous and complex issues. Raw recruits had to be inprocessed and trained 
with special skills to meet the complex nature of the battlefield.36 Troops required 
sufficient basing and areas in which to train. Constructing sufficient basing and training 
areas would also result in allocating scarce materials that would be necessary to 
producing vital equipment. Lastly, the equipping of divisions to meet the sophisticated 
nature of combat required the incorporation of “scheduled production of munitions and 
equipment reaching back through the whole intricate complex of war industry and, in the 
case of specialized items, involving a time-lag of up to eighteen months.”37 Producing, 
equipping, and training Army units, while reconciling the disparate and competing 
industrial base requirements and maintaining a productive base would be vital to 
sustaining the mobilization effort and defeating the enemy. 
There were also operational considerations. First, had the United States continued 
with its original estimate of 213 divisions, there would still have been the constraint of 
insufficient shipping to transport the divisions to Europe. In essence, “shipping would 
determine the amount of force that could be applied.”38 Additionally, the U-boat threat 
had to be resolved before U.S. forces could be projected across the Atlantic.39 Second, it 
was recognized that projections of military power “must be very conservative until our 
[the Allied] strength developed.”40 Lastly, as the war progressed from 1941 to 1943, the 
original assumption on which the Victory Program was based was proving false. The 
Soviet Union was successful in holding the German advance. 
Faced with these considerations, General Marshall and his planners were driven 
first by the necessity of balancing mobilization requirements while maintaining the war 
production effort. A close examination of division training, equipping, and war 
production with their associated time lags was considered. General Marshall also pressed  
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to reexamine the strategic environment — primarily the ability of the Soviets to resist the 
Germans and the increasing effectiveness of the Allied Strategic Air Bombing campaign 
and air superiority in Europe.41 
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee — the body chartered to examine these 
strategic considerations — concluded that: 
. . . planners had gone astray in trying to match Allied forces, division for 
division, with the enemy. They held that proper consideration had been 
given neither to the relative efficiency of forces nor the prospective Allied 
air superiority and the effect of the bomber offensive on German morale 
and war effort.42 
 
Based on these considerations, the U.S. Army reassessed its manpower requirements and 
concluded in 1943 that a 90 Division ceiling would be sufficient to defeat the Axis. The 
last division was activated in August 1943. The basis of General Marshall’s 90 Division 
Gamble was based on, “air superiority, ground combat unit training, and Soviet 
numerical preponderance.”43 
 
3. Decision Success 
General Marshall’s decision to reassess the U.S. Army’s manpower requirements 
and establish a new 90 Division ceiling during a period of extreme crisis would not have 
been possible without a solid planning framework. The unique aspect of this framework 
was typified by a high degree to plan and link the nation’s war production to operational 
capabilities, possessing an in-depth understanding and confidence in the U.S. Army’s 
combat training program and its effectiveness despite the United States relatively untried 
combat capabilities, and a keen understanding how these factors related to the ongoing 
changes in the conflict with the Axis powers. 
The United States significantly reduced the levels of its Armed Forces after World 
War I. Despite these reductions, there were three major factors that contributed to future 
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success in World War II. The first was the creation of a joint Army and Navy Munitions 
Board. This board was designed to examine the capacities of U.S. industry to support 
wartime requirements and the allocation of resources between major competitors — in 
this case the Army and Navy.44 Through outlining requirements, identifying critical raw 
materials and industrial competencies, and developing joint strategy, the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board provided the foundational basis and venue to develop wartime 
contingency planning from a perspective of industrial capacity. Recognizing the value of 
this board and foreseeing the necessity to further link the nation’s economy to support the 
oncoming conflict, President Roosevelt moved this board under the Executive Office of 
the President in 1939.45 
The second factor and a new innovation was the founding of the Army Industrial 
College. The college was created as a direct result of the inability to link the U.S. 
industrial base to wartime mobilization in World War I.46 This one-year program offered 
U.S. Army officers the basis for studying the intricacies of industrial mobilization, the 
associated time-lags between a peacetime and wartime economic footing, and partnering 
with industry. The growing number of students and faculty would later serve as the 
foundation for industrial mobilization planning.47 The refinement of mobilization 
strategies during the interwar period by the Army and Navy Munitions Board and the 
growing numbers of military professionals graduating from the Army Industrial College 
provided two foundational elements for General Marshall’s decision to redirect the U.S. 
Army’s manpower ceiling in 1943. 
The last factor supporting General Marshall’s decision was the maintenance of the 
U.S. Army’s training base. Despite the drawdown after the First World War, the U.S. 
Army continued to maintain, albeit at a reduced capacity, its systems of training officers 
and enlisted personnel. As a result, the U.S. Army had a good understanding of the 
requirements that were necessary to develop and improve course capacities to produce 
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trained personnel. Additionally, the U.S. Army understood the value of lessons learned in 
combat, the importance of realistic training, and the necessity for close inspections and 
oversight to monitor training progress.48 These three factors would allow General 
Marshall and his planners to develop a realistic manpower ceiling, link the production of 
capabilities to the industrial base, and accurately assess the combat value of the U.S. 
Army divisions. 
Although an argument can be made that the maintenance and development of 
these planning and training mechanisms were not part of a deliberate or concerted effort, 
the development, preservation and refinement of these mechanisms during a period of 
fiscal scarcity resulted in creating and honing the skills that were necessary to rapidly and 
effectively mobilize the nation. The key element to consider is that these factors were not 
developed on the eve of World War II, but had their genesis during the period after 
World War I — over twenty years prior. Simply stated, the ability to effectively plan, to 
understand the capacity of the U.S. industrial base, and to correlate training programs to 
operational capabilities were honed throughout the decades before the United States’ 
entry into the war. 
 
4. Decision Characteristics 
Although General Marshall’s decision could only be classified as a success after 
the benefit of hindsight, his decision can be viewed as a calculated risk rather than a 
gamble. General Marshall’s decision to cap the U.S. Army at 90 Divisions was a decision 
grounded in a solid understanding of the strategic environment, the effective linking of 
wartime requirements to the industrial base, and accurately assessing the ability of the 
U.S. soldier. The underlying understanding of these intricacies was not, however, a 
product of spontaneous insight, but based on a well-informed and well understood system 
of mobilization. 
The United States was relatively unprepared when it entered World War Two. 
Despite the level of unpreparedness, the United States “had never before in our history 
                                                 
48 Palmer and others, The Army Ground Forces, 448-450. 
25 
entered a war with such a well-concerted program of strategy.”49 Perhaps more 
importantly, not only did the United States and its Allies have a clear idea for success, 
they also possessed the highly skilled ability to link industrial capacities to military 
capabilities. Once the U.S. economy was fully mobilized, the quality and amount of 
military capabilities surpassed the most conservative of estimates.50 
The success of General Marshall’s decision is directly attributable to the 
preservation and maintenance of the U.S. Army’s underlying base. Learning from the 
mobilization lessons from World War I, the Army was able to preserve its joint strategy 
and planning mechanisms though the creation of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. 
The development of the Army Industrial College ensured a highly trained cadre of 
military professionals with ties to U.S. industry who understood the challenges and 
opportunities of the industrial base. The maintenance of the Army’s training capacity, 
both in terms of physical areas for basing and training, as well as the system to track 
combat proficiency would ensure the United States could rapidly build-up its forces. 
It was the development and maintenance of these boards, schools, and systems 
during the interwar period — a time of extreme scarcity for the U.S. military — that 
served as the mechanisms for the rapid mobilization and sustainment during World War 
II. These mechanisms were in essence, the capacity building tools that served to ramp up 
the wide array of combat capabilities that were necessary to win the war. The 
development, maintenance, and continual refinement of these underlying strategic 
mechanisms allowed the U.S. senior leadership to understand the linkage between the 
nation’s manpower and its industrial base, the requirements that were necessary to 
mobilize these elements, and the sustainment requirements vital to galvanizing this 
process. They allowed the strategic leadership to understand the inherent trade-offs, 
constraints, limitations, and opportunity costs involved in weighing various alternatives. 
More importantly, these mechanisms and tools were also focused under a well articulated 
strategy aimed at a defined end-state — the unconditional defeat of the Axis powers. 
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General Marshall’s 90 Division gamble also represents a strategic decision point. 
It altered U.S. mobilization estimates and reconsidered other factors — the abilities of the 
Soviet Union and the effectiveness of the Allied bombing campaign. His decision 
changed the U.S. Army’s outlook from a symmetric force-on-force correlation that was 
characteristic of the First World War to a different approach that capitalized on Allied 
strengths. This decision also ensured that a proper balance was maintained between the 
nation’s underlying industrial capacities versus the amount of military capability it could 
effectively maintain in combat. 
The understanding of this balance ensured that issues relating to the preservation 
of capacity and sustainment were central to the development of strategy. The primary 
Allied consideration during the beginning stages of the war was to remain on the strategic 
defensive while taking advantage of limited objectives and preserving capacity. The 
Allies were mindful of the inherent dangers involved in over-mobilization. Over-
mobilization would strain the underlying industrial base, mismatch capabilities for when 
they were not needed, and weaken the future sustainment of these capabilities because 
they had been produced in over abundance. In essence, strategy and procurement were 
strongly and effectively linked. As a testament to General Marshall’s farsightedness, a 
total of 89 U.S. Army divisions were deployed to combat theaters by the end of the war.51 
 
C. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 
1. Background 
During the early years of the United States, westward expansion typified by far 
flung settlements and a strong sense of self-reliance became the defining characteristic of 
state and local autonomy over education matters.52 Although public school and collegiate 
systems were supported and developed, the establishment of a cohesive national 
education policy was never a priority until the early 1950s.53 Initial attempts by President  
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Eisenhower to enhance federal support for education initiatives were not supported by a 
conservative leaning Democratic Congress, which sought to limit the expansion of the 
federal government.54 
The national focus on mathematical, scientific, and linguistic skills also 
diminished after World War Two. Despite the significant scientific gains made during the 
war, as manifested by the massive fielding and sustainment of military capabilities and 
the scientific collaboration to develop the atomic bomb, these fields saw a decline after 
the Allied victory in 1945. While Cold War tensions were on the rise, the nation as a 
whole focused on demobilization and returning to normalcy. 
The lack of a comprehensive national education approach corresponded with a 
period of high focus on education in the Soviet Union — particularly on scientific and 
educational matters. The Soviet Union was able to quickly develop atomic weapons, 
invest and build in missile technology, achieve several Nobel prizes in scientific areas, 
and develop the satellite technology necessary to launch Sputnik.55 More importantly, 
these achievements were conceived, developed, and quickly implemented within a ten-
year period after World War II. 
The ability of the Soviet Union to launch Sputnik was a severe blow to U.S. 
prestige.56 Launched in October 1957, Sputnik represented a significant demonstration of 
Soviet focus, ambition, and achievement. It also represented a significant threat to U.S. 
interests.57 Noted nuclear scientist, Edward Teller, stated the United States lost “a battle 
more important and greater than Pearl Harbor.”58 The Soviet’s ability to launch a satellite 
into space represented a significant asymmetric advantage and highlighted a relative 
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change between the United States and the Soviet Union. Whereas before, the United 
States assumed technological superiority, the launching of Sputnik shattered that notion. 
2. The Strategic Decision 
The blow to U.S. prestige had a positive effect in that “[i]t awakened and spurred 
us [the United States] into rigorous self-examination of our total education system.”59 
The realization of a Soviet advance into an unchartered area characterized by a 
significant potential for military applications such as intelligence gathering, 
communications, and weapons was too significant to overlook. In response to Sputnik, an 
overarching goal to develop a strong foundation in science, math, and linguistic capacity 
to sustain the nation’s effort in meeting this threat was initiated. As a result, President 
Eisenhower along with strong bipartisan support was able to pass the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958. The passage of this Act represented a stark departure from 
previous U.S. educational policies and directly inserted the U.S. government into the 
nation’s strategic education policy. 
The primary consideration of the Act was twofold. First, the United States 
recognized the long nature of the Cold War and the increasingly sophisticated 
requirements from the nation’s industrial base, the armed forces, and international 
diplomacy.60 United States leadership in the free world would require increased numbers 
of highly qualified individuals to support the nation’s security efforts. Second, the 
language contained in the Act recognized the need for a sustained and coordinated effort. 
With increased focus on getting high school students enrolled in university science, math, 
and linguistic programs, the Act predicted “that between 30 and 40,000 new full-time 
college teachers each year will be needed to train the wave of students seeking college 
education in the sixties.”61 Emphasis was given to professional development initiatives at 
the university level, the upgrade of facilities, and new teaching techniques to meet the 
increased demands on the nation’s students. In essence, there was a recognized need to 
develop capacity on a large scale over a long period of time. 
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There were also secondary considerations that were viewed as integral to the 
success of the plan. High school dropout rates were viewed as a serious limitation to 
getting students to seek university-level education.62 The plan recognized that targeting 
university-level education was insufficient and that corresponding initiatives were 
necessary to improve the linkage between high school and college. As a result, significant 
increases and focus were given to student counseling and guidance needs to ensure that 
students achieved their potential and placement.63 Education reform initiatives were not 
narrowly focused on university education, but widely focused on end-to-end and related 
issues. 
 
3. Decision Success 
The National Defense Education Act of 1958 represented a strategic decision in 
response to a perceived threat. Unlike the decision success of the 90-Division Gamble — 
which was solidly based on the centralized decision framework around President 
Roosevelt and the corporate mechanisms the U.S. Army had developed and honed during 
the interwar period — there was no history of U.S. government policy and planning for 
national education issues. Despite this lack, the success of the decision to pass the 
National Defense Education Act possessed similar elements. There were also two 
supporting decision elements that were critical to its success — a solid organizational 
framework and corporate mechanisms to support and sustain the effort. 
Unlike the armed forces where policy mechanisms ultimately support the 
President’s actions as the commander-in-chief, the critical organizational framework in 
the case of the National Defense Education Act was the importance of the federal 
government to effectively and efficiently handle the distribution of funds and grants to 
university, state, and local education systems. As George Michel pointed out: 
 
[C]entral policy decision makers encouraged gatekeepers, commissions, 
interest groups, and individuals to increase the flow of educational 
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demands at a national level. The blockage between large flow of demands 
and a small flow of educational policies had to be dissolved.64 
In this case, the effectiveness of the education grant system to support larger, non-federal 
initiatives was viewed as a critical function to attain the envisioned end-state of the plan. 
Envisioned under the National Defense Education Act was the preponderance of 
federal funding and commitment to support student loans for university, state, and local 
institutions. As a matter of principal, the federal government would provide 90 percent of 
the funding, with the remainder coming from other institutions.65 The funding 
mechanism was quickly established. In fiscal year 1960, the federal government provided 
$61.5 million with other institutions bringing this total to $67.6 million.66 
There was also a corresponding focus to develop the corporate mechanisms to 
support and sustain the plan’s intent. These efforts echoed the development of the Joint 
Munitions Board, which served to effect strategic planning and the development of the 
Army Industrial College to serve as the institutional base to educate, train, and provide 
research fellowships with the nation’s industrial base. The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) was created in direct response to Sputnik as well as the 
Advanced Research Project Agency within the DoD. These two agencies served to focus 
the nation’s research and development efforts into space and national security matters. 
Federal funding between 1957 and 1961 for research and development doubled and 
funding for the National Science Foundation tripled.67 It also developed within the 
National Science Foundation a Science Information Service — essentially a mechanism 
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4. Decision Characteristics 
Strategic decisions are not made in a vacuum. The success of the National 
Defense Education Act of 1958 can be attributed to several decision characteristics, which 
although would not in and of themselves ensure its success, they would ensure the best 
possible chance for an optimal outcome. The federal government’s effort and the passage 
of the Act supported an envisioned and articulated end-state — to focus resources to 
address the scientific, mathematic, and linguistic shortfalls and close the increasing 
intellectual manpower shortages that were confronting the nation.69 In other words, there 
was a clear idea of success. Measures were taken to support this end-state and 
organizations developed and strengthened to close this gap. 
Despite Sputnik’s blow to U.S. prestige, the primary course of action was not to 
embark on a short-term effort to quickly procure scientific talent to build specific 
capabilities — in this case space vehicles and technology — but rather to seek a long-
term solution by improving and expanding the capacity of the underlying scientific base. 
There was increased collaboration between the U.S. and its allies on scientific matters, 
however, the passage of the Act aimed to change the underlying strategic environment of 
the situation. The focus on expanding the foundational base was also based on a strong 
stakeholder buy-in coupled with solid bipartisan support. President Eisenhower utilized a 
consultative and brainstorming style which, “figure significantly in predicting the success 
in education policy.”70 Despite earlier attempts to block his educational initiatives, the 
National Defense Education Act was passed by Congress in September 1958 with strong 
support.71 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson continued with a strong national education 
policy and placed these initiatives high on their respective agendas — ensuring continued 
commitment and stability.72 
The National Defense Education Act of 1958 fundamentally changed the federal 
government’s approach in educational matters. It can be viewed as a strategic move, 
which broke a long history of the federal laissez faire approach and redefined the role of 
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education as a strategic national asset.73 Foremost in this decision was the recognition of 
the nation’s critical intellectual manpower shortfalls. The launching of Sputnik served as 
the catalys for  change. 
The recognized need for the development of an intellectual base brought 
sustainment concerns to the forefront. Arthur Flemming, the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare under President Eisenhower, offered an insightful comment. He 
said, when speaking to the students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces — the 
successor to the Army Industrial College: “But you know far better than I do that fear by 
itself never results in a sustained effort to achieve a constructive goal.”74 The response to 
Sputnik was focused on longer-term strategies aimed at capitalizing and expanding 
inherent U.S. strengths — a strong academic and scientific base. Strong stakeholder and 
bipartisan buy-in ensured the sustainment, focus, and continuity of the strategy. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
General Marshall’s 90 Division Gamble and President Eisenhower’s National 
Defense Education Act focused the nation on countering strategic threats. Their efforts 
were also forms of capacity building. They addressed the larger strategic problems of 
sustaining combat capabilities in the Second World War and the development of a 
scientific research and development base to guide and sustain U.S. efforts during the 
Cold War. These decisions addressed strategic capacity building efforts, the mechanisms 
that were necessary to sustain these initiatives, and the steps that were critical to making a 
better prepared nation. These initiatives were also directly linked to a well defined 
strategy centered on an identifiable end-state with a clear idea of success.  
During the Second World War, it was necessary to link global strategy to 
industrial procurement, to preserve and expand industrial capacity to sustain Allied 
efforts, and build upon the mechanisms and expertise that were developed during the 
interwar period to ensure success. The National Defense Education Act represented a 
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stark departure to previous U.S. administrations’ approach to education. It sought to link 
national security and education. It recognized the United States needed to expand its 
scientific and engineering base to sustain future research and development efforts. The 
Act also led to the development of collaborative venues for scientific research. 
These decisions also had a temporal aspect. For General Marshall, the decision to 
maintain the U.S. Army at 90 Divisions was a product of the means and mechanisms that 
were implemented after World War I. General Marshall and his planning staff would 
have faced a seemingly unsurpassable obstacle in attempting to link strategy to 
mobilization had these mechanisms never been implemented. President Eisenhower’s 
decision was almost the opposite. His decision point represented the impetus to link 
national security to education. The National Defense Education Act represented the point 
of departure in the nation’s strategic plan to overcome the Soviets in science. This 
decision sought to improve and expand the underlying educational capacity that would be 
necessary to sustain U.S. efforts in science and engineering. 
These decisions were also focused on a defined end-state — the necessary 
conditions for victory. For General Marshall, it was the unconditional defeat of the Axis 
while preserving U.S. strengths and capitalizing on industrial advantages. President 
Eisenhower, also an Army Industrial College graduate, recognized the need to develop 
and eventually surpass the Soviets in science. He understood the Cold War represented a 
new form of conflict and one that would last for decades. His view was on creating the 
necessary capacity and the initial impetus to sustain the United States. 
The examination of these examples would indicate that capacity building has the 
following attributes. Capacity building: 
• Focuses on the strategic and the long-term 
• Requires a substantive or recognized commitment to expand or preserve 
• Requires knowledge of the end-to-end capacity linkages that produce 
specific capabilities, infrastructure, training base, logistics, to understand 
opportunity costs and trade-off decisions 
• Contains material and social aspects 
• Is directly tied to sustainment 
34 
Capacity building measures indicate those things that should be invested or implemented 
in the present — even during times of scarcity similar to the U.S. Army during the 
interwar period — or preserved that will support a strategy over the long-term. It is also 
directly tied to the strategy’s purpose — to win the Second World War or to beat the 
Soviets. Similarly, the implication for a homeland security capacity building concept 
centers on the actions and resources that should be invested or implemented in the present 
and that are tied to the envisioned purpose of the strategy. 
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III. FOCUSING ON KEY HOMELAND SECURITY SYSTEMS: 
CHALLENGES TO THE LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK 
A. LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK 
1. Mission and Scope 
The United States can focus its homeland security effort to address shortfalls in 
critical systems that are essential to the country. These systems are critical in terms of 
how they relate in their scope and in the essential nature to the continuity of the missions 
they support. These systems can range from the National Highway Network for 
transportation or the nation’s nuclear power generation for strategic energy needs. In this 
case, homeland security capacity building measures could be interpreted as supporting or 
expanding physical systems along with associated personnel which are foundational and 
critical to the continuity of the homeland security mission. The upgrade of these systems 
would require significant front-loaded costs for research and development, expansion and 
recapitalization, associated manning considerations, and investment. An example of such 
a system is the Laboratory Response Network. 
Government officials recognized the serious threat of terrorism during the 1990s. 
The Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (U.S. Policy 
on Counterterrorism) after recognizing the rise in terrorist activity that was manifested by 
the attacks at the World Trade Center in 1993 and overseas. Additionally, there were 
concerns about the terrorist’s interest in nuclear, chemical, and biological materials for 
use as a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) — as evidenced by the Aum Shinrikyo 
attacks in Tokyo in 1994 and 1995. PDD 39 stated: “The United States shall give the 
highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage 
the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by 
terrorists.”75 Additionally, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 
1996, more commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, charged the DoD with 
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providing training assistance to other federal, state, and local organizations.76 Absent in 
these initiatives were the scope, investment, and capacity that were necessary to support 
and sustain the development of these capabilities. 
The Laboratory Response Network was established in 1999 as a result of these 
growing WMD concerns. Consisting of a partnership between the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United States Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), these networked laboratories were 
designed to “link state and local public health laboratories with other advanced-capacity 
clinical, military, veterinary, agricultural, water, and food-testing laboratories, including 
those at the federal level.”77 The mission of the Laboratory Response Network is to 
“maintain an integrated national and international network of laboratories that can 
respond quickly to acts of chemical or biological terrorism, emerging infectious diseases 
and other public health threats and emergencies.”78 
 
2. Laboratory Response Network: Organization 
The Laboratory Response Network operates as an integral component of a larger 
public health framework. In the United States, public health consists of several 
governmental and non-governmental entities — such as the American Red Cross — that 
are primarily focused on the prevention of infectious diseases, other illnesses, and injuries 
throughout the population. Key public health functions include: 
. . . disease surveillance to detect outbreaks and to monitor trends; 
specialized laboratory testing to identify bioagents, both in individuals and 
in environments; epidemiologic methods to identify persons at risk and to 
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monitor the effectiveness of prevention and treatment measures; 
knowledge of disease processes in populations to determine appropriate 
responses such as quarantine, decontamination or the dissemination of 
treatment recommendations; and coordination with partners to establish 
effective planning and response.79 
 
Such a decentralized framework, while aimed at meeting and responding to local level 
requirements, also requires the appropriate tools — the sufficient capacity and integration 
— at the lowest levels for it to work effectively. Given this framework, which crosses 
several levels of government and other sectors, some of the key performance parameters 
that support a rapid local response with robust laboratory capacity are the sufficient 
equipment and laboratory space to identify and analyze pathogens, the education and 
training of its personnel, and the ability to plan and coordinate across various 
organizational levels. Physical capacity, professional knowledge, and data sharing are the 
critical components. 
The Laboratory Response Network has distinct protocols and structures for 
responding to chemical and biological scenarios. It also operates under an organizational 
framework similar to any public health response. The initial incident assessment will 
involve local public health officials. Based on their assessment, local jurisdictions can 
draw upon other local, state, and federal support should the incident be of sufficient 
magnitude.80  
Although these laboratories are currently divided into three categories — national, 
reference, and sentinel labs — in 2001, this tiered architecture was divided into four 
groupings of laboratories each designed to fulfill certain functions. Inherent to the 
efficient operation of this network is the ability to quickly detect, classify, and manage 
data amongst the different levels. Descriptions of the levels are contained below: 
• Level A: Focused on early detection of biologic agents. Laboratories at 
this level would typically be local public health or hospital laboratories 
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lower biosafety protocols. Laboratory staffs are trained to identify 
potential harmful pathogens for further shipping and analysis by 
laboratories with higher biosafety protocols. 
• Level B: Typically state or local public health laboratories with the ability 
to conduct presumptive-testing and identification of specific pathogens. 
The focus of Level B laboratories is to conduct confirmatory testing. 
• Level C: Are located typically at advanced state, academic institutions, or 
the federal level to conduct highly advanced testing of pathogen samples. 
The laboratories have the ability to conduct pathogen evaluations for 
possible treatment solutions. 
• Level D: These laboratories are at the federal level and consist of highly 
developed capabilities to evaluate and test very rare and harmful pathogen 
strains. These laboratories also contain the highest level of biosafety 
protocols.81 
State and local laboratories operating at different levels and with different capabilities 
would factor significantly to the CDC’s response during the anthrax incident. 
The laboratories that participate as part of the Laboratory Response Network are 
also required to meet certain federal criteria such as justifications on how the laboratory 
supports state or local public health efforts, meeting prescribed safety standards, adhering 
to federal standards for physical and personnel security requirements, and ensuring secure 
communications for transmission of pathogen test information.82 In return, these 
laboratories receive federal support and grants. Although the Laboratory Response 
Network has grown, the first true test of the network’s ability to respond to a national 
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3. Status of Public Health and Laboratory Response Network prior to 
the 2001 Anthrax Attacks 
The status of the Laboratory Response Network in 2001 must be viewed within 
the wider context of strategic public health investment and focus given the network’s 
integral role within public health. The strategic focus and investment in the country’s 
public health infrastructure declined after World War II. Significant advances in the 
development of medicines and medical treatment shifted “the biomedical paradigm for 
responding to infectious disease.”83 The paradigm shift focused on individual care versus 
more traditional community-wide public health approaches. Although the focus shifted to 
individual care and advances in medicine “the proportion of total health spending 
dedicated to public health rose from 0.72 percent in 1960 to 1.32 percent in 2000.”84 
When considering inflation, population growth, and the paradigm shift, this increase 
represented very little real growth, if any, in public health spending and investment for 
services that addressed broader population needs. A 1996 study from two state public 
health departments indicated that more than two-thirds of public health spending was 
dedicated to personal care versus broader population-based services.85 
The focus of public health spending and investment also shifted from the federal 
government to state and local responsibility. The federal government expanded its role 
during the 1930s as part of the New Deal with the creation of the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) and several programs aimed at training public health professionals.86 This 
trend shifted after World War II. By the 1990s, approximately 29 percent of public health 
spending came from federal sources while the rest came from state and local funding.87 
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Additionally, overall decreases in public health spending during the 1990s resulted  
in  a  decline  of public  health  services.88 
Investment in public health infrastructure and training aimed at broad-based 
population services lessened as a result of the paradigm shift. Coupled with the lack of 
real growth in the public health sector and a decrease in federal focus, the overall 
structure of the system was neglected. In public health, critical capacities are considered a 
“comprehensive preparedness and response plan, building adequate laboratory capacity, 
and ensuring the capability to communicate between public health departments and law 
enforcement agencies.”89 In the decades leading up to the twenty-first century, direct 
investment in laboratory capacity and data sharing capabilities were neglected.90 The 
CDC was forced to rely on antiquated laboratories with little funding for capital 
investment. Data sharing capabilities were also neglected. A survey in 1998 revealed that 
only 45 percent of local public health departments had the ability to send alerts via fax to 
their respective communities.91 Additionally, as late as 2001, only 68 percent of the 
nation’s county health agencies possessed Internet connectivity.92 
The network’s capacity was also limited in terms of its physical dimension. The 
CDC’s effort in the late 1990s and early 2000 resulted in great strides to network 
laboratories and improve collaboration. The physical capacity, the underlying laboratory 
facilities, equipment, and data handling mechanisms, still required improvement. It 
required direct investment, which at the time would have meant a significant front-loaded 
and follow-on sustainment cost. This lack of investment would result in a marginally 
networked laboratory system focused on response, but weak in terms of an underlying 
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capacity cushion that could absorb heightened national demands.93 In essence, 
capabilities had been sought, but the underlying capacity to produce, integrate, and 
expand these capabilities on a larger scale was lacking. 
Public health training programs also suffered. A national survey conducted in 
1983 concluded that only 57 percent of epidemiologists met the academic qualification 
standards for that profession.94 Another bioterrorism training study in 2000 for state 
public health agencies indicated that only 5 percent of their personnel had received 
training.95 Despite the heightened awareness in the 1990s, personnel training and 
professional development initiatives aimed at increasing levels of awareness remained 
problematic. 
The CDC ramped up its bioterrorism planning effort in the 1990s after decades of 
neglect to the public health infrastructure, training, and lack of strategic direction. From 
1998 to 2001, the CDC was not only leading the development of the Laboratory 
Response Network, but was developing diagnostic and epidemiologic standards and 
increasing the capability of the Strategic National Stockpile.96 The multiplicity of several 
significant organizational tasks also overstretched the CDC. Despite these efforts, 
coordination between the various public health government entities, non-governmental 
organizations, and the private sector remained highly fragmented.97 
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B. 2001 ANTHRAX ATTACKS 
1. Bacillus Anthracis 
Bacillus Anthracis, more commonly known as anthrax, is a naturally occurring 
disease that can be transmitted from animals to humans. It is found globally, although the 
more high risk areas are usually in those countries that have poor public health 
infrastructures.98 It is a bacteriological disease that can spread quickly among animals 
causing significant losses. In its natural state, the disease can have several and often lethal 
effects if transmitted to humans. 
Anthrax is also of significant concern as a biological weapon.99 The bacteria itself 
poses risks; however, the greater concern is the dry and concentrated form of anthrax 
spores. These spores, when inhaled, reach into the respiratory system and concentrate in 
the lymph nodes, which reproduce in the blood stream to produce toxins that can lead to 
death.100 Although humans can become infected through various forms — through skin 
contact or inhalation — the critical factor is the bacteria’s incubation period. The effects 
of cutaneous anthrax are usually less than one day and inhalation anthrax less than one 
week.101 Given a possible one-week period, the key factor in combating anthrax is the in-
place disease surveillance measures and laboratory testing ability to determine if an 
actual occurrence has taken place or to determine a false-positive. 
There were 22 people directly affected by anthrax between October 4 and 
November 22, 2001. Of the 22 cases, 11 were from skin exposure and 11 from inhalation 
anthrax. The five fatalities were from the respiratory form of infection.102 The epicenters 
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of the attacks were in Florida, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, and Washington D.C. Despite being confined to seven states and the federal 
district, the 2001 attacks had national implications. As a GAO report found: “[E]ven in 
areas far removed from the epicenters, residents brought samples of suspicious powders 
to officials for testing and worried about the safety of their daily mail.”103 
The first case occurred in Florida when a media employee was identified with the 
inhalation form of anthrax. Other cases were then identified in New York and New 
Jersey. These cases were cutaneous and affected postal workers through exposure of 
anthrax-laced envelopes. The fourth case — a cutaneous incident — occurred in 
Washington, D.C. by opening an envelope mailed to Capitol Hill. The next case, from an 
affected postal worker, occurred in the Washington D.C. area. This case, however, was 
inhalational and showed that people could be affected by this more fatal form by handling 
sealed envelopes. The following anthrax cases in New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut, which affected more postal employees, were inhalational and further 
confirmed that exposure to sealed envelopes could result in inhalational anthrax.104 The 
average duration between anthrax exposure and the manifestation of symptoms was 4.5 
days.105 Although the attacks affected a small group of people, the scale of the response 
and clean-up was massive. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency estimated 
the total cost and time for cleaning up the Capitol Hill epicenter was $28 million with 
three months of processing over 10,000 air and surface samples.106 
 
2. Physical Laboratory Limitations during the 2001 Anthrax Incidents 
The Laboratory Response Network consisted of 80 labs during in 2001.107 The 
CDC along with other federal, state, and local governments to include the private sector 
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developed this network as a result of rising bioterrorism concerns in the late 1990s. The 
ability of the network to perform its mission, however, is directly dependent upon a wider 
set of public health infrastructure. The CDC views the Laboratory Response Network as 
an essential capability — closely linked with disease surveillance and epidemic 
investigation — within the wider public health infrastructure and response. 
 
Figure 2.   Pyramid of Public Health Preparedness (After the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Public Health’s Insfrastructure: A Status Report) 
 
Disease surveillance measures, laboratory practice, and epidemic investigation efforts 
must be synchronized and planned for the overall system to operate effectively. They are 
the essential elements necessary for an effective public health response. 
The Laboratory Response Network is also dependent on other factors. The public 
health model for analyzing naturally occurring outbreaks or a covert release of a 
biological agent is for those affected to first seek treatment with their local health 
provider to diagnose and treat symptoms. After these providers report symptoms, local 
and state public health officials collect and monitor this data for trend analysis. 
Laboratories collect clinical and environmental samples for further testing and 
epidemiologists use disease surveillance systems and reported data to assess and 
characterize disease outbreaks. After determining the size, scope, and nature of the 
outbreak, public health officials are responsible for providing treatment protocols and 
information to the clinical community and the public.108 
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In terms of throughput capacity, a typical Laboratory Response Network facility 
operated under some preconceived assumptions prior to the 2001 attacks. For example, 
the New York City’s Public Health laboratory “processed one or two samples per month, 
utilizing a small Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) room with two dedicated personnel.”109 The 
capacity assumptions to support a crisis would prove false. The sample throughput 
increased approximately 3,000 times after the anthrax incidents.110 
There were also issues with physical capacity. In New York’s case, the 
laboratory’s size was a 400 square foot area, which contained biosafety and analysis 
equipment, incubators and refrigeration units for storage, and a computer for data-
entry.111 The laboratory’s configuration was consistent with the design recommendations 
from the Department of Health and Human Services and CDC, which contained requisite 
safety equipment serving as the primary protection barrier — specialized cabinets, 
containers, and personal protective equipment and physical design and construction as the 
secondary protection barrier — physical obstacles and ventilation equipment.112 
The anthrax incident also led to increased demands for laboratory space and 
personnel. Laboratory space was at a premium and personnel requirements increased 25 
times. Six tons of additional equipment and supplies were required in New York’s Public 
Health laboratory to support the surge. Demands on maintaining custody, tracking 
requirements, and having to hastily institute a database management system for receipt, 
analysis, and sample forwarding quickly overwhelmed preconceived planning 
assumptions and working models.113 A comparative synopsis is shown below: 
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Figure 3.   New York City Laboratory Comparison (From Michael B. Heller’s 
Laboratory Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism) 
 
A GAO report concluded that “the large influx of samples strained the physical 
capacities of the laboratories.”114 According to the CDC, over 125,000 clinical samples 
and 1 million environmental samples were processed.115 The physical limitations 
identified included a shortage of biosafety cabinets, insufficient testing chemicals, and 
other supply shortages. Other critical functions, primarily epidemic investigation, were 
also overstretched. Public health departments and a variety of Level A and B laboratories 
required individual support from outside agencies like the CDC or the DoD to meet their 
epidemiological needs. Additionally, the use of volunteers was limited due to the lack of 
a credentialing system.116 Interestingly, when viewed over time, “State health agencies 
employed fewer epidemiologists — specialists in infectious disease investigations — in 
2002 than they had a decade earlier.”117 The physical and manning capacities had 
regressed. In this case, there was a negative capacity cushion — the amount of capacity 
in excess of expected demand — that had been allowed to diminish. 
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3. Strategic Public Health Response Limitations 
The 2001 Anthrax attacks severely strained local capacities as evidenced by the 
challenges facing the New York City’s Public Health laboratory. There were also 
significant challenges at the strategic level. The CDC was hard pressed to maintain an 
effective response during the months of October and November 2001 despite the 
relatively localized geographic scope and the limited amount of people exposed to 
anthrax. The first challenge centered on a preexisting planning assumption that later 
proved false. The CDC had never responded nor was optimally postured to deal with the 
multiple outbreaks caused by the intentional release of a biological agent.118 Despite 
having global influence and national responsibilities, the organization was not postured 
physically or with sufficient personnel to respond to multiple issues. During this period, 
the CDC was faced with having to support multiple localities — many located away from 
actual epicenters. They also had to individually tailor their support based on unique state 
and local responses and on their individual response capacities. These local requirements 
also varied greatly. Some localities relied solely upon the CDC for epidemiologic 
investigation while others simply required support for surge laboratory requirements.119 
The CDC was also faced with serving as the clearinghouse and a central node for 
receiving and disseminating critical information in response to a nationwide event. To 
support the increased data handling requirements, the CDC had to quickly convert an 
auditorium into a 24-hour-a-day, multi-agency, operations center in order to respond to 
varied and numerous requests.120 Other CDC shortfalls included “surveillance; clinical, 
epidemiologic, and environmental investigation; laboratory work; communications; 
coordination with law enforcement; medical management, administration of prophylaxis; 
monitoring of adverse events; and decontamination.”121 
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C. LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK: CAPACITY BUILDING? 
1. Implications 
A review of the Laboratory Response Network and its ability to respond to the 
2001 Anthrax Attacks reveals two points. First, while there was a networked set of 
laboratories, the prevailing assumptions of their ability to handle a national incident 
proved false. The network was barely able to maintain the demand for its services. The 
network was not prepared to handle the size and scale of the clinical and environmental 
samples. In this case there was little to no capacity cushion built into the system. 
Laboratory space and equipment were overstrained and there was insufficient data 
handling equipment to collect, catalogue, and report findings. In terms of manning, there 
were also insufficient staff, laboratory technicians, and epidemiologists with the 
sufficient training and in sufficient numbers to respond. 
Second and perhaps more importantly, there is considerable doubt whether these 
levels of activity would have been sustainable. This incident affected all fifty states. Each 
state and large metropolitan area had individual sustainment issues, which required 
support from the CDC whether in terms of epidemiology, laboratory technicians, or basic 
supplies. The CDC, not suited to respond to multiple requests, was not postured to deal 
with more than one incident at a time. Despite the recognized threat posed by terrorism in 
the 1990s and the recognized need to develop capabilities, there was no corresponding 
effort to develop larger foundational capacities to support and sustain these capabilities 
on a larger and more sustained scale. 
In context, the Laboratory Response Network can be viewed as a critical 
homeland security capacity — essential to the national public health response and 
continuity during an emergency and foundational to the performance and continuity of 
this homeland security mission. Under the intent of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD)-8 (National Preparedness), capacity building can be interpreted to 
mean that the U.S. government will engage in capacity building measures by increasing 
investments in specific areas to expand or recapitalize critical systems that support 
homeland security efforts — in this case, the Laboratory Response Network. This 
interpretation would be consistent with acknowledged capacity building activities in the 
scientific and medical community, which include the procurement of new systems and 
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equipment, training of personnel, the creation of new research centers, new laboratories, 
and the implementation of new data sharing systems.122 
 
2. Challenges 
a. Nature of Costs 
There are two challenges with utilizing this interpretation of capacity 
building — the nature of the costs involved and political acceptability. The nature of the 
cost is founded on three factors. You need to know where you are, where you need to be, 
and how you want to get there.123 A current assessment of the Laboratory Response 
Network is necessary to know where you are. An envisioned goal is also necessary to 
know where you need to be. A strategic investment strategy is fundamental to 
determining how the envisioned goal can be attained. The stated overarching goal for 
Public Health Laboratory Testing is: 
Chemical, radiochemical, and biological agents . . . are rapidly detected 
and accurately identified by the public health laboratory within the 
jurisdiction or through network collaboration with other appropriate local, 
State, and Federal laboratories. The public health laboratory, working in 
close partnership with public health epidemiology, environmental health, 
law enforcement, agriculture and veterinary officials, produce timely, 
accurate data to support ongoing public health investigations and the 
implementation of appropriate preventative or curative counter-measures. 
Public health laboratory activities will also be coordinated with public 
safety, law enforcement, hospitals, and other appropriate agencies.124 
 
This goal articulates the envisioned attributes of the network — rapid assessment, 
accuracy, collaboration, and coordination. These attributes represent the desired end-
state, or clear idea of success, of where the network needs to be. The network should 
have cutting-edge equipment, streamlined and robust data sharing mechanisms, and a 
trained workforce in sufficient numbers for rapid and accurate assessments. The specific 
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or measurable physical level or throughput envisioned in the end-state is contained in the 
Target Capabilities List (TCL). In this instance, the targeted capacity for a state public 
health laboratory would be the ability to process 40 samples per day under given planning 
assumptions.125 
The TCL also contains numerous statements on laboratory equipment, 
data handling requirements, training, and personnel levels.126 Although the TCL 
identifies an estimated capacity — in this instance for a state public health laboratory — 
along with targeted capabilities and estimated capacities for other requirements, the 
underlying capacity building issue for the Laboratory Response Network centers on a 
strategic capacity building investment strategy that addresses the question of how you 
want to get there consistent with achieving the most from limited national means. The 
capacity building strategy factors the network’s present condition, envisioned goals and 
the necessary capacity building investments to implement and sustain this capacity. In 
this case, there is no capacity building strategy to answer these questions. 
The development of a capacity building strategy represents a strategic 
decision point and critical implementation issue. Congressional testimony given after the 
2001 Anthrax and 2003 SARS incidents on public health preparedness would indicate: 
• Laboratory capacity is not “uniformly robust” throughout the network. 
• Only half of the states have a laboratory with the requisite equipment and 
personnel training for “rapidly assessing and correctly identifying 
biological agents.” 
• Approximately half the states reported having a laboratory with sufficient 
biosafety measures to handle biological agents like anthrax. 
• Data handling and communication remains an issue.127 
Despite some initiatives, there is clearly room for improvement. Given the targeted levels 
in the TCL, a capacity building strategy to improve this network would have to consider 
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the capital investments and costs that are necessary to expand laboratory capacity, the 
necessary equipment for laboratory testing, data handling requirements, and sustainment. 
In a capacity building strategy, the nature of these costs is threefold. 
Capital investment requires up-front or front-loaded costs. Equipment purchases, 
laboratory expansion, adherence to safety standards, and implementation of data handling 
protocols require initial outlays of capital and resources. It also requires a determination 
of a realistic capacity cushion to absorb unforeseen and unplanned requirements. Lastly, 
associated sustainment costs are necessary for the continued viability of the network and 
to prevent obsolescence. 
A capacity building strategy aimed at building the viability of the 
Laboratory Response Network requires front-loaded costs. These costs should factor “… 
how much of what kinds of capacity are to be provided over time, given the likely 
evolution and variability ….”128 For example, are estimated laboratory sample estimates 
contained in the TCL accurately considering the new threat posed by a worldwide 
pandemic? Are differences between chemical and biological responses and testing 
considered? How are increases in population factored into the strategy over time? Other 
variables can include the amount of given laboratory floor space, types of equipment, 
personnel shifts, and organizational procedures.129 These issues, particularly when 
viewed at a broad level and considering the front-loaded nature of the cost represents a 
strategic decision point and a commitment to implement the initiative. They also 
represent a risk because the capacity building steps taken today may not be realized until 
some point in the future.130 
A realistic capacity cushion for the Laboratory Response Network is also 
a strategic necessity. Given the criticality of the network, this cushion factors unforeseen 
circumstances, unplanned requirements, and allows the network greater flexibility and  
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redundancy to respond. Maintaining excess capacity is typically an expensive proposition 
— another factor when considering the implementation of a long-term capacity building 
strategy.131 
The last cost associated with this capacity building strategy is the inherent 
sustainment costs that are associated with maintaining the network’s viability. Long-term 
sustainment costs are perhaps the greatest concern. There is considerable debate whether 
the federal government’s homeland security initiatives will be sustained to support 
continued mechanisms over the long-term. As Falkenrath points out: “There is a real risk 
that the improvements put in place will not be sustained. Equipment purchased may grow 
obsolete and inoperable. The training provided may be forgotten, lost to turnover, or not 
offered to new public servants.”132 Given the historical nature of tight state and local 
operating budgets, not accounting for sustainment costs will result in an ineffective 
program. Although economies of scale are gained through long-term capital investments 
and increased standardization, sustainment costs are a necessary consideration.133 
The front-loaded and sustainment cost considerations represent an 
opportunity cost and a trade-off consideration. Front-loaded investment decisions require 
an up-front commitment and buy-in. It requires a determination of the capacity’s scope 
and how other factors relate to the investment in a critical capacity, whether political, 
economic, or societal. These factors also affect the necessary, but narrower issues, of 
developing specific capabilities that would be inherent to successfully enhancing the 
network. In short, this interpretation of capacity building would require planners to 
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b. Political Acceptability 
Political acceptability is also a challenge with this type of capacity 
building interpretation. Federal, state, and local governments are typically wary of 
initiatives requiring front-loaded costs with significant long-term commitments. The 
allocation of large amounts of money and resources also represents an opportunity cost. 
Simply put, money allocated towards revamping and sustaining the Laboratory Response 
Network means that those resources cannot be applied elsewhere. Strong commitments to 
these types of initiatives require a clear external stimulus — as evidenced by the 
historical examples of World War II and the Eisenhower National Defense Education Act 
of 1958. 
The issue with revamping the Laboratory Response Network and 
associated disease surveillance and epidemiologic capabilities is a challenging 
proposition. The United States experienced a decline in wider public health investment 
since the 1960s. There were still significant shortcomings to the Laboratory Response 
Network in 2001 despite the increased emphasis in the late 1990s on bioterrorism issues. 
Additionally, there remain significant capacity issues despite the 2001 Anthrax incident 
and the 2003 SARS outbreaks. State and local jurisdictions are still challenged to seek 
and retain epidemiologic and laboratory personnel.134 A 2004 study revealed that “29 
states and [Washington] D.C. reported they did not have adequate numbers of lab 
scientists to test for a potential anthrax or plague incident.”135 This report also indicated 
that for about half the states, over 25 percent of their public health officials were nearing 
retirement age. 
It would seem that there has been a very limited stakeholder buy-in or 
emphasis given the nation’s slow decline in public health and the continued challenges 
facing the Laboratory Response Network. This decline has occurred despite the external 
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stimuli of 9/11, the 2001 Anthrax incident, and the 2003 SARS case. The underlying 
capacity issues, whether in the form of equipment or personnel, remain problematic. 
This lack of progress may be the product of a larger context. It is 
acknowledged by non-governmental organizations engaged in third world capacity 
building efforts that “political leadership and the prevailing political and governance 
systems are critical factors in creating opportunities and setting limits for capacity 
development efforts.”136 These organizations view these governance systems as the 
enabling environment. 
The enabling environment in the United States is its federalist governance 
structure and the variety of programs that support public health initiatives. As outlined in 
a Council of Foreign Relations report: 
National coordination, resource support, and leadership by the federal 
government are all essential. But encouraging the capacity for states, 
localities, and the private sector to experiment and to be flexible in 
adapting to local and regional circumstances will ensure that our nation’s 
approach to homeland security will be as dynamic as the threat that 
confronts us.137 
 
National support, collaboration, flexibility, and adaptation are some of the key factors 
that are necessary for revamping the nation’s public health and the Laboratory Response 
Network. The overarching problem is that public health initiatives have typically not 
received wide political support. Additionally, despite the increased availability of funding 
after 9/11 and the 2001 Anthrax incidents, allocated funds were required to be spent 
during a short time period resulting in limited time to “develop coherent effective plans 
and meet the immediate needs for workforce training and preparation.”138 This is 
indicative of an inflexible and hasty implementation approach. Quickly reacting to a 
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situation, while necessary during an on scene response or tactical event, typically leads to 
wasteful spending and poor coordination with the overall implementation effort at the 
strategic level.139 
Utilizing a capacity building definition that defines homeland security 
capacity building efforts as — The U.S. government will engage in capacity building 
measures by increasing investments in specific areas to expand or recapitalize critical 
systems that support homeland security efforts — inevitably requires a solid stakeholder 
analysis that seeks and promotes buy-in. It also requires a careful consideration of a 
capacity building strategy, the opportunity costs involved, and the sustainment issues. 
Given the wide and complex nature of the disparate elements involved in the Laboratory 
Response Network and its associated public health elements, taking the time to develop 
and implement a strategy based on realistic timetables and measures will better address 
the front-loaded nature of the costs, the necessary capacity building strategies, the 
strategic decisions, and the sustainment issues that are associated with revamping a 
critical system that directly supports the nation’s overall homeland security. 
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IV. FOCUSING ON KEY HOMELAND SECURITY PROGAMS: 
THE REVAMPING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY’S GRANT PROGRAM 
A. THE DHS GRANT PROGRAM 
1. Background 
Another capacity building alternative is to reform key areas in the government to 
better support the homeland security effort. The United States can engage in capacity 
building measures aimed at improving the organizational capacity of key programs and 
functions to increase efficiencies, streamline processes, and transform government to 
ensure that homeland security missions are carried out effectively and in support of 
national goals. These programs can range from government reform initiatives — for 
example, the streamlining of the DHS or DoD — to key individual programs that have a 
vital impact. The streamlining of government and key programs focuses on improving 
efficiencies, identifying cost savings, and eliminating redundancies. A key program that 
is vital to homeland security is the DHS Grant Program. 
The members of the 9/11 Commission recognized the key obstacle to homeland 
security assistance. As stated in their report, they recognized the inherent difficulties for 
the government to set priorities, to ensure equity in providing assistance, and to link 
assistance funding to risk. One of the Commission’s key recommendations stated that 
assistance should be based on risks and vulnerabilities. They also cautioned that this 
program “. . . should supplement state and local resources on the risks and vulnerabilities 
that merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel.”140 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 granted the DHS Secretary the authority to 
consolidate key areas to form the department.141 In January 2004, the DHS Secretary 
combined the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination (SLGC) to form the Office of State and Local Government 
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Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). The purpose of the reorganization was to 
consolidate all assistance and grant programs into one office to streamline the process, 
closely link it to the office of the Secretary, and to create a single focal point for 
homeland security assistance matters.142 In 2005, the SLGCP was further consolidated 
into the DHS’ Preparedness Directorate as the Office of Grants & Training (G&T). 
The G&T’s mission is to: 
. . . prepare America for acts of domestic terrorism by developing and 
implementing a national program to enhance the capacity of state and 
local agencies to respond to  incidents of terrorism, particularly those 
involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
(CBRNE) incidents, through coordinated training, equipment acquisition, 
technical assistance, and support for Federal, state, and local exercises.143 
 
Inherent to the G&T’s mission is the need to enhance the capacity of state and local 
jurisdictions to more effectively respond to homeland security incidents. The implied 
goal of the grant program is to engage in capacity building measures to foster the 
development of homeland security capabilities. 
 
2. Purpose and Organization of Grants 
Grants serve as policy tools, along with other regulations or tax strategies, to 
focus government resources and efforts into particular areas. Ideally, the system of grants 
is used to “enhance the capacity of all levels of government to target areas of highest risk 
and greatest need, promote shared responsibilities by all parties, and track and assess 
progress toward achieving national goals.”144 The government utilizes these policy tools 
to foster additional capabilities for public goods that have interjurisdictional spillover 
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effects in society.145 Examples of these public goods range from medical care and public 
health to law enforcement — and in this case, first responders. 
Grants are designed in various forms, address specific issues, and contain 
different criteria. In general, grants can be divided into three categories — each allocating 
different levels of responsibility to grant recipients. On one extreme, there are categorical 
grants, which limit the recipient’s flexibility on how grant funds can be allocated. 
General revenue sharing grants allow the greatest flexibility while block grants achieve 
some measure of balance between the government and the recipient.146 
Categorical grants are the most common form of federal assistance. They are 
designed to support specified and defined activities. Categorical grants can be divided 
into four different types — formula grants, project grants, formula-project grants, and 
open-end grants. Formula grants are designed where legislative rulings mandate that 
funds be distributed according to a formula.147 A contemporary form of a formula grant 
was passed by the Congress with the enactment of the Patriot Act, which mandated that 
each state receive 0.75 percent of homeland security preparedness grants.148 A specific 
group of interested recipients compete for project grant funds while open-end grants are 
those where the government commits to subsidize a portion of state or local spending.149 
Block grants are a method to consolidate grants that have similar goals and focus 
on similar areas. They typically pass the preponderance of responsibility to state and local 
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officials for administration and monitoring.150 Consolidating block grants is a strategy to 
streamline grants into similar categories to facilitate the allocation process for recipients. 
Most block grants are also formula-based but allow greater discretion to the recipient. 
Preparedness grants are a combination of formula, project, project-formula, and 
open-ended grants. The Citizen Corps, the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grants, and Emergency Management 
Performance Grants (EMPG) are formula driven based on the 0.75 percent of allocations. 
Assistance to Firefighters’ (FIRE) grants is a project grant and based on recipient 
applications and competition. EMPG and FIRE grants are also open-end grants where the 
federal government matches 50 percent of the total costs.151 Lastly, the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) is a discretionary grant based on vulnerability assessments, 
population density, and critical infrastructure.152 The major grants are below: 
 
Figure 4.   Selected Consolidated Terrorism Preparedness Programs Within the 
Office for Domestic Preparedness (From Congressional Research Service, 
First Responder Grant Formulas: The 9/11 Recommendation and other 
Options for Congressional Action) 
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3. The Evolution and Consequences of the Federal Grant System 
The role and use of grants within the U.S. federalist structure has evolved greatly 
over time. Grants, along with other tools, which include regulatory mechanisms and tax 
incentives, have been implemented to focus resources into particular areas. The use of 
these tools also affects the sustainability of government efforts.153 The U.S. 
government’s involvement with grants goes back to the beginning of the Republic when 
the Congress passed the Land Ordinance of 1785, which required localities to set aside 
land for support to public schools.154 Other significant legislation occurred in the 1860s, 
with the passage of the Morrill Act. This Congressional initiative provided to the states a 
categorical grant designed to assist the states in establishing colleges.155 Consistent with 
the design of categorical grants were the inclusion of highly specified responsibilities 
placed on the state to meet federal objectives. 
There was a significant paradigm shift in the 1960s with the federal government’s 
role in providing grant assistance. Although the U.S. government’s role in giving 
assistance to state and local jurisdictions started to rise as part of President Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, President Johnson greatly expanded the role of the federal government as part 
of the Great Society initiatives. There were more grant programs developed during his 
administration than in all the preceding administrations combined.156 These programs 
targeted the expansion of educational opportunities, intercity development, medical care, 
and combating poverty in all aspects of society.157 During this period there was an 
additional dynamic at work. Although there was an effort to devolve as much 
responsibility to the states from the federal government as part of an overall 
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decentralization initiative, there was a corresponding effort by the federal government to 
tighten control on the use and purposes of grants — leading to an inflexible system.158 
From the period of President Eisenhower’s administration (1953-1961) and the 
expansion of the government’s support to education as seen by the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 to President’s Johnson’s Great Society (1963-1969), the U.S. 
government’s total grant outlays nearly ten times, from $2.1 billion to $18.6.159 The 
federal government’s influence into local affairs also grew exponentially as a result of its 
commitment in terms of actual dollars and the proliferation of numerous grant programs 
aimed at targeting a variety of social issues. An entire infrastructure was developed at all 
levels to process, track, and assess grant outlays. 
Reforming the U.S. government’s grant system is not a new issue. Due to 
widespread proliferation, increasing complexity, and inflexibility within the grant system 
itself, the Government Accountability Office stated in 1975 that the increasing problem 
of managing grants stemmed directly from their proliferation.160 Several attempts have 
been made to reform the system. Congress passed the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act 
of 1969 in an attempt to address some of the federal, state, and local coordination 
issues.161 The Nixon administration attempted to organize and simplify the complex 
grant system to improve efficiencies and streamline processes.162 The Joint Funding 
Simplification Act of 1974 introduced some flexibility allowing grant recipients to 
combine funding from different federal grants.163 Although President Reagan’s Omnibus 
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Reconciliation Act of 1981 consolidated 77 programs into 9 block grants, the overall 
grant program has increased in terms of number and complexity over time.164 
As far back as 1978, the National Governor’s Association recommended two 
policy decisions for the Carter Administration, which stemmed from their concern over 
the federal government’s grant system. First, they noted the continuing erosion of state 
government responsibilities as a result of direct federal funding to local jurisdictions. 
Second, they highly encouraged the administration to streamline the grant process, while 
recommending the “cutting of red tape and high administrative costs, and reduction of 
mandates that impose substantial burdens on state and local taxpayers for relatively small 
benefits.”165 Although there have been several governmental attempts to reform the grant 
program, these periods of reforms are typified by subsequent periods of grant 
proliferation with corresponding overhead management costs to track, monitor, and 
assess the multitude of programs. 
 
Figure 5.   Trend in the Number of Federal Grant Programs to State and Local 
Governments (From General Accountability Office, Grant System 
Continues to be Highly Fragmented) 
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The trend in grant proliferation and increased federal government involvement 
over the last fifty years has led to several consequences. One consequence of increased 
federal involvement has been the erosion of state authority at the expense of direct federal 
interaction with local — particularly county — jurisdictions.166 This erosion of state 
authority has consequences with developing strategies that require regional approaches. 
Additionally, direct federal involvement at the expense of the states has redefined the 
concept of federalism — a factor the National Strategy for Homeland Security considers 
essential to successfully implementing an effective homeland security program tailored to 
meet local needs.167 Diminution of state authority and the complexity of federal 
assistance to varying jurisdictional levels have further contributed to state and local 
fragmentation.168 Increased degrees of fragmentation lead to further integration problems 
and the achievement of national goals. 
Another consequence of utilizing grants to attain national objectives has been the 
propensity of the Congress to attach additional layers of requirements, many of which 
often have no direct association with the grant program itself.169 Unlike the National 
Defense Education Act, which emphasized a specific, highly targeted, and simplified 
process, compliance with these additional requirements, which range from national policy 
goals such as a clean environment, discrimination, or equal hiring practices, leads to 
increased administrative and overhead costs to expedite the grant program. These 
national goals, while laudable, cumulatively increase administrative and processing costs. 
The enforcement of national goals — not directly related to the grant program itself — 
should not impede the allocation of the grant. Additionally, the proliferation of grants 
further exacerbates the problem because many of the grants can be used for similar, if not 
identical, purposes.170 The proliferation of grants, overlapping programs, and excessive 
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administrative requirements results in confusion at state and local jurisdictions.171 The 
insertion of additional requirements not directly associated with the grant program and 
the multiplicity of similar and overlapping programs are indicative of a total lack of 
strategic perspective within the overall grant process. 
Despite the intent of the grant process to promote self-sustainment, the expansion 
of grants has resulted in an increased reliance on the government for areas that were 
previously administered by the states. With homeland security, federal grant funding has 
increased immeasurably. This increased reliance on the federal government has resulted 
in a phenomenon known as the “raiding of the fiscal commons.”172 These raids occur in 
areas where there are soft budget constraints and in areas where lower levels of 
government count on financial support from the central government.173 As highlighted by 
Oates: “Intergovernmental grants are a fundamental source of soft budget constraints.”174 
Despite maintenance of effort clauses within individual grants, a federal grant system that 
has the side effect of promoting increased reliance on the federal government brings forth 
the issue of and concern of sustainment.175 Over dependence on the central government 
directly affects sustainability — particularly if grant efficiency and continued funding 
stability are questionable. 
Lastly, an unintended consequence of expanding federal grants has been the 
increase in having to deal with the administrative minutiae of processing grants. The 
proliferation, complexity, and overlapping nature of grants have resulted in prodigious 
amounts of duplication, high administrative costs, and lots of red tape.176 There has been 
a corresponding increase in grant proliferation despite repeated attempts to consolidate, 
                                                 
171 United States General Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to 
Better Meet Outstanding Needs, GAO-03-1146T (Washington, DC: GPO, September 3, 2003), 4; 
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d031146t.pdf (accessed on October 5, 2006). 
172 Oates, “On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization,” 18. The Raiding of the Fiscal 
Commons is a concept used to describe the over reliance of lower levels of government on central 
authorities to underwrite their operating losses.  
173 Ibid., 21. 
174 Ibid., 23. 
175 United States General Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to 
Better Meet Outstanding Needs, 15. 
176 Julian M. Carroll and Richard A. Schnelling, 92. 
66 
streamline, and reform the system.177 This would indicate that there has also been a 
corresponding price in the nature of doing business to administer, allocate, and monitor 
the use of grant funds at all levels of government. In terms of measuring costs over a long 
period, the cost of administering grants is distributed. These costs accumulate and 
increase as overlap, proliferation, and complexity increase. Bottom line, the costs 
associated with the grant program are not front-ended, but are increasingly costly to 
administer over time. 
As Paul Light discusses capacity building concepts concerning nonprofit 
organizations, “capacity building involves an activity such as planning, reorganizing, 
merging, downsizing, assessing, auditing, installing, training, recruiting, measuring, 
treating . . . . As such, the case for capacity building hinges on finding a positive 
relationship between the activity and organizational effectiveness . . . .”178 The overall 
complexity of the grant system, its duplication and administrative red tape make for a 
poor example of linking effectiveness to a positive relationship. 
 
B. THE DHS GRANT SYSTEM SINCE 9/11 
1. Strategic Guidance 
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 created a significant loss of life and catastrophic 
damage. As a result of the attacks, the U.S. government fundamentally altered its course 
and approach to domestic security. For the first time since the Cold War, there were 
discussions on critical infrastructure protection, border security, and continuity of 
operations. Despite this policy change, there were many who recognized the importance 
of carefully crafting a national strategy and strategic guidance to chart the country’s 
efforts. Ideally, this strategy and guidance should create a framework for the long-term 
sustainment of the homeland security mission. 
As noted, the 9/11 Commissioners recognized that one of the most significant 
challenges for any branch of government is to set priorities. The commissioners 
understood the government’s need to effectively prioritize and set clear guidance based 
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on objective principles — ideally divorced from partisan politics. One of their  key  
recommendations  was: 
Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of 
risks and vulnerabilities. . . . We understand the contention that every state 
and city needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency 
response. But federal homeland security assistance should not remain a 
program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local 
resources on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support. 
Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel.179 
 
The Commissioners highlighted the importance of linking assistance to risks, 
vulnerabilities, and needs while cautioning against the use of homeland security funding 
for general revenue sharing purposes. Their recommendation also addressed the 
fundamental need for all jurisdictions to have a minimum — in essence — a baseline of 
protection. Their proposals have been echoed by others to ensure government spending 
and grant allocations follow a model of focused and disciplined spending on targeted 
areas and priorities.180 
This disciplined construct is also addressed in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. The strategy offers seven guiding principles, which are supposed to serve as the 
philosophical underpinning of the strategy. These principles are: 
• Require responsibility and accountability 
• Mobilize our entire society 
• Manage risks and allocate resources judiciously 
• Seek opportunity out of adversity 
• Foster flexibility 
• Measure preparedness 
• Sustain efforts over the long-term 
• Constrain government spending181 
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In terms of allocation and management, several of the guiding principles address the need 
to manage risk while allocating resources in a focused and disciplined manner, to 
effectively measure preparedness while accounting for minimum baseline requirements, 
sustaining efforts over a long period, and the importance of establishing trade-offs within 
the budget by carefully targeting spending. 
The National Preparedness Goal outlines the need for developing and 
implementing a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness. This document 
recognizes the need for an assessment based on a cooperative and integrated approach 
with input from all levels of government and the private sector.182 The Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) identifies the necessary capabilities for jurisdictions to meet 15 
all-hazards National Planning Scenarios. In the document, capability elements are 
equated to the resources necessary to accomplish a given set of tasks.183 These capability 
elements can include manpower, equipment, planning resources, and training. 
Achieving success in homeland security is compounded by the 87,000 separate 
jurisdictions that fall under the construct of the strategy plus the numerous foreign 
dimensions of the homeland security mission. The effectiveness of the strategy is 
incumbent upon the effective collaboration between the various stakeholders and 
adoption of a flexible approach that does not attempt to apply one methodology for every 
jurisdiction.184 In other words, a federal cookie-cutter approach to homeland security is 
bound to fail. 
The DHS Secretary under the authorities of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
consolidated disparate grant programs under one office to provide a single focal point for 
grants. The DHS Grant Program is the federal government’s principal mechanism to 
support state, local, and private effort to increase homeland security preparedness. It is 
also the mechanism to ensure that the homeland security mission is sustained over the 
long-term. 
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2. Challenges to the DHS Grant Program 
Utilizing a capacity building definition that focuses on governmental efforts that 
improve the organizational capacity of key programs — such as the DHS grant program 
— in order to streamline critical processes that support homeland security is based on a 
flawed system that stems from the challenges to the overall process. Despite the strategic 
guidance, these flaws originate from the inability to establish an effective baseline, the 
continued fragmentation of the grant system, the grant mechanism’s complexity, and the 
underlying organizational structure. Absent in the guidance are the discussion of 
sustaining efforts over the long-term, trade-off considerations, mechanisms to foster 
national planning efforts or to prompt any reevaluation of strategic assumptions. 
Determining the baseline for 87,000 jurisdictions is a daunting task. Although 
there are targeted levels of capabilities in the TCL, these levels do not contain the 
overarching strategies and assessment methodologies to determine the expectation, 
integration of intergovernmental support, and underlying mechanisms to sustain various 
initiatives. For example, the Secure Border Initiative calls for implementing various 
technologies to create “smart borders” in conjunction with increased detention capacities 
and border enforcement personnel.185 What is not contained is “a clear specification of 
what is expected of a smart border, including consideration of security and economic 
aspects of moving people and goods.”186 Another study found flaws in the department’s 
program management strategies for personnel and acquisition of new technologies. There 
were also shortfalls in linking the strategy to other governmental departments.187 
In relation to the DHS grant program, another difficulty in determining baseline 
levels is the inability to develop regional and integrated plans to establish goals, needs, 
and priorities. Utilizing the border protection example, local agencies are having 
difficulties in determining the regional approach to border security due to a lack of 
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information on “the amount of first responder grants available to each jurisdiction, budget 
plans or criteria used to determine spending priorities, and data on funds expended from 
various sources.”188 The lack of cross-linking individual efforts to wider regional 
initiatives with federal ones is inconsistent with the principles of the national strategy. 
The difficulty in determining an effective baseline is compounded by the 
continued fragmentation of the DHS Grant System. As the Gilmore Commission noted:  
[T]he absence of coordinated preparedness efforts makes it difficult to 
develop training and exercised standards that are agreed on and utilized by 
all relevant training  centers. Some current funding processes have DHS 
and other agencies awarding preparedness grants directly to public and 
private recipient organizations with no pre-award coordination with the 
States. Recognizing that some of the current programs will inevitably not 
“flow through” the States, there should, at a minimum, be vertical 
coordination requirements among Federal agencies and local governments 
with States on all funding allocations, to ensure consistency with statewide 
strategies.189 
 
In addition, with the inability to effectively plan due to bypassing state entities, 
the continued web of disparate grant programs from multiple federal agencies hampers 
the implementation of effective state and local strategies. These fragmentation issues are 
from a lack of coordination and linkages between the wide varieties of terrorism 
programs in the federal government.190 Simply put, grant recipients must still work 
through a maze of grant programs to determine which programs can be financed to meet 
their needs.191 Due to the highly fragmented state of grant programs, it is difficult to 
develop strategies and target funds and resources due to the numerous programs, 
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differing grant allocation methods, varying grant requirements, and multiple  
levels of recipients — state, local, or private.192 
Compounding the fragmentation challenges lies the issue of complexity within the 
grant system. State and local grant recipients consistently state that federal programs are 
“duplicative, confusing, and poorly focused.”193 One 1990s study of federal preparedness 
programs described the complexity of programs as “mushroomed without supervision, 
evaluation, or coordination, resulting in a confusing mess.”194 This issue has continued 
unabated. As the Congressional Budget Office stated: “The allocation of homeland 
security funding to over 200 appropriation accounts within the federal budget 
substantially complicates efforts to track such spending.”195 It is difficult to assess 
whether the U.S. government is effectively targeting funds given a fragmented and 
complex system that inhibits looking at the issue from a strategic picture. 
Lastly, the underlying DHS organizational structure exacerbates the ability to 
provide effective support to regions, states, and individual localities. The lack of a 
regional DHS structure that is embedded with state, local and private entities and 
modeled along regional lines inhibits collaboration, contingency planning, and an 
effective response. The federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted that the DHS 
lacked “sufficient field capabilities to organize a fully successful Federal response 
effort.”196 A regional DHS organization complemented by targeted grant designs that 
promote regional solutions, whether by establishing a regional requirement as a 
contingent for federal funds or matching levels of effort, would serve to assess 
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preparedness and foster collaboration to target efforts aimed at addressing regional and 
local problems.197 Additionally, a DHS regional structure coupled with grant designs that 
promote regional approaches would enable contingency planning in advance, rather than 
continuing to react to events. 
The organizational challenge possesses another dynamic, which directly affects 
long-term sustainability issues. As James J. Carafano and David Heyman state: 
Experience reminds us that it takes only a few years for a bureaucracy to 
become entrenched. After that, it becomes nearly impossible to change. 
The creation of the Department of Defense is a case in point. In the 
debates over the 1947 National Security Act and again as President, 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower lobbied for reorganizing the Pentagon to 
ensure that Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force assets would work closely 
together. However, he failed to overcome the political opposition and 
service parochialism that block reforms. As a result, fundamental 
problems in joint operations went unaddressed until passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The lesson is clear: Fix it at the beginning 
or live with the mistakes for a long time.198 
 
The Gilmore Commission recommended a DHS enterprise architecture aimed at 
facilitating federal support and fostering collaboration with state and local entities to 
achieve measurable and sustained preparedness.199 The window of opportunity for 
change is closing. A more entrenched bureaucracy that is not regionally based and a 
flawed grant system will continue to disburse funds to buy capabilities that are not linked 
into a strategic context or into a regionally-based approach. It will also not address the 
wider actions that are necessary to drive strategic investment, build and strengthen 
underlying infrastructure, and account for sustainment. Additionally, if organizational 
and grant reforms were enacted today, the funds and the capabilities that have been 
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procured to date may not be the optimal ones — particularly if strategic assumptions are 
not reassessed. This mismatch will increase over time. 
 
3. DHS and Preparedness Funding 
The formation of the DHS and the significant increases in preparedness funding 
since 9/11 bring into consideration whether underlying capacities have been strengthened 
through the DHS Grant System. There has been a considerable effort to develop national 
strategies and plans, but often times an overreaction or a hasty approach can lead to 
wasteful spending, mismanagement of resources, and a focus on the short-term rather 
than a long view of the problem.200 Additionally, as part of the strategy, the U.S. 
government has created the third largest bureaucracy to bolster homeland security and 
preparedness.201 As one homeland security professional stated: “[T]he most important 
question is whether America is getting the maximum level of benefit in exchange for this 
increase in spending.”202 
The total outlays for all federal grants to state and local jurisdictions were $426.82 
billion for FY2005 and an estimated $459.7 billion for FY2007.203 For specific homeland 
security funding, the FY2007 budget earmarked $58.3 billion. Since 2001, the U.S. 
government has disbursed $22.5 billion to state and local preparedness functions, which 
include assistance to first responders and public health. Annual spending on homeland 
security has risen from $350 million in 2001 to a projected $4 billion for FY2007 — over 
a ten fold increase in spending.204 
Four issues must be considered when assessing whether underlying capacities 
have been measurably strengthened by the DHS Grant Program. First, there is the 
question of oversight. Oversight mechanisms are required to track whether sufficient 
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resources are properly being targeted to address risks and vulnerabilities. Second, is the 
issue of pork barrel and wasteful spending. Pork barrel spending and general revenue 
sharing at the expense of homeland security will seriously hamper any effective 
implementation efforts. The third issue is a grant program throughput issue. In other 
words, are the allocated resources being expended to improve preparedness? Lastly, the 
issue of determining trade-offs is vital when considering the long-term sustainment of the 
homeland security strategy. Are trade-offs being considered given the finite resources of 
the U.S. government? 
Executive oversight for homeland security matters remains problematic. Despite 
the formation of the DHS to coordinate homeland security activities, actual homeland 
security related activities are conducted by 33 distinct federal departments and 
agencies.205 The oversight effectiveness of the DHS to track these activities, given the 
wide-spread nature within the executive branch and other organizations and with 
homeland security funding being separated into 200 distinct funding accounts, is 
considerably diminished and difficult.206 Additionally, the ability of the DHS to monitor 
the effectiveness of the grant program remains weak due to limited ODP staff and 
infrequent field visits to track grant implementation.207 
Legislative oversight is also an issue. The 9/11 Commissioners realized the 
importance of this issue. One of their key recommendations was for Congress to “create a 
single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.”208 As one report 
stated: “At least 11 full committees in the Senate and 14 full committees in the House — 
as well as their numerous subcommittees — claim oversight or some responsibility for 
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various U.S. programs for combating terrorism.”209 Recent reform attempts by creating 
specialized appropriations subcommittees and a select committee for homeland security 
have not addressed the underlying issue that approximately 79 oversight panels claim 
some responsibility over homeland security affairs.210 The inability of Congress to 
reform its committee system inhibits oversight effectiveness. 
Despite the admonishment of the 9/11 Commission, pork-barrel spending at the 
expense of homeland security remains a serious issue. Some criteria for pork follow: 
• Appropriation not properly authorized by Congress or requested by the 
administration 
• Unauthorized or unrequested appropriation is locality or facility specific 
• Appropriation involves transfer of federal resources that circumvent 
existing laws 
• New items added that were not considered in Congressional bills during 
debate211 
The recent trend of pork-barrel spending is disturbing. In FY1999, there were 1,000 pork-
barrel projects contained in 13 appropriation bills.212 In FY2006, there were 9,963 pork-
barrel projects contained in 11 appropriation bills totaling approximately $29 billion.213 
For example, there has been approximately $560 million dollars allocated to 1,200 
projects supporting port security. A recent DHS Inspector General Audit noted that many 
of the port security grants were allocated for “a purpose other than against an act of 
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terrorism.”214 Earmarking projects in appropriations bills coupled with a poor grant 
allocation process and dividing 40% of allocation funds equally among states and 
territories inhibits the targeting and investment of scarce resources for high priority 
tasks.215  
The ability of the DHS grant system to quickly process grants and the ability of 
grant recipients to implement resources to improve preparedness is another factor in 
assessing effectiveness. This is essentially a system throughput issue. Although there 
have been improvements to expediting grant requests — averaging 123 days in FY2002 
for processing grants versus 15 days in FY2003 — there are still issues with expending 
funds.216 The stark realization is that many of the funds that have been allocated for 
homeland security preparedness have not been expended. As of 2004, approximately $6 
billion of homeland security preparedness funding had not been spent due to delays in 
assessment and other obstacles.217 Another aspect of the throughput issue is the extensive 
backlog on first responder equipment orders. One reason for the backorder lies with 
individual procurement regulations at state and local jurisdictions. In relation to 
underlying capacity, however, another reason is that first responder equipment purchases 
have conflicted with military purchasing of similar equipment.218 With military needs at 
a higher government purchasing priority, first responder orders lay unsatisfied. 
Lastly, the questions of trade-offs and fiscal discipline are of paramount 
importance. Given the events of 9/11, the formation of the third largest federal 
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bureaucracy and the necessity to implement the homeland security strategy, the ability to 
make hard choices, eliminate duplicative programs, and streamline efficiencies is tied to 
sustaining homeland security over the long-term. As one person stated: “Since the 
number of possible attacks is effectively unlimited and the resources we can devote to the 
fight against terror are limited, it means that spending should not occur without a careful 
cost-benefit analysis.”219 
At the strategic level, government outlays between FY2001 ($1.86 trillion) and 
FY2007 ($2.77 trillion) have increased approximately 48.9 percent.220 During this 
period, the DoD budget has grown 73.9% and the DHS budget 190 percent — 
understandable due to its recent creation. In terms of trade-offs, however, spending for 
other government programs has also grown at impressive rates. For example, the 
Department of Health and Human Services grew 64.1 percent and Education 80.5 
percent.221 Security-related and non-security related spending have both increased at 
significant rates — raising the question on trade-offs, cost benefit analysis and hard 
choices. 
The ability of the U.S. government to conduct effective oversight, eliminate 
waste, increase the grant system’s throughput, and make hard choices directly affects the 
sustainment of homeland security over the long-term. Eliminating waste and developing 
realistic budget projections, stable funding lines, with sufficient guidance to state, local, 
and private grant recipients can sustain homeland security efforts.222 These efforts play a 
fundamental — indeed critical — role to support capacity building efforts. 
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C. THE DHS GRANT SYSTEM: CAPACITY BUILDING? 
1. Implications 
A look at the DHS Grant System and the wider implication of U.S. government 
fiscal practices illustrates three points. First, while consolidation efforts have taken place 
to streamline the grant allocation process, there still remain extensive fragmentation, 
duplication, and inefficiencies within the system. Many of these grant mechanisms also 
lie outside the purview of the DHS. These inefficiencies are directly related to the flawed 
system of grant allocation that existed prior to 9/11 and the formation of the DHS. 
Additionally, new homeland security preparedness funding has had a tenuous link to 
preparedness standards, expectations, and assessment. A lack of understanding regarding 
expectations makes it difficult for jurisdictions to project what standard they need to 
achieve. Related to planning efforts is the lack of regionalization. While not part of the 
grant system, the inability of the DHS to initially regionalize its organization has 
hampered planning efforts and regional solutions. 
Second, weak executive and legislative oversight for homeland security makes it 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of past, current, and projected efforts. The spreading 
of homeland security related functions within the executive department limits the ability 
of the DHS — the department directly empowered to assess homeland security efforts — 
to effectively assess activities at a strategic level. The congressional inability to reform its 
committee structure is also considered by some to be “the single greatest obstacle to 
creating an efficient and effective Department.”223 
Lastly, the lack of U.S. government fiscal accountability and discipline will 
directly hamper future homeland security tasks. The inability to control wasteful 
spending and pork-barrel projects aimed at supporting constituencies with little to no 
application for homeland security diffuses the effectiveness of supporting capacity 
building efforts. As evidenced by present fiscal policies, the inability to conduct trade-
offs within the budget and to make hard choices to eliminate redundant programs, reduce 
waste, and reallocate resources to support higher priorities will also directly affect 
sustainment efforts. 
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The DHS Grant Program plays a vital role in supporting homeland security 
activities. It is also critical to the success of sustaining the homeland security mission 
over the long-term. Additionally, the reforming of the DHS Grant Program has wider 
implications to the effectiveness of other grant programs, gaining efficiencies in 
government, eliminating wasteful spending, and fiscal discipline. For the purposes of 
defining capacity building measures for homeland security — can the DHS Grant 
Program serve as such a measure? 
A comparison between the Laboratory Response Network and the DHS Grant 
Program reveals a subtle difference. The focus on implementing measures to develop the 
nation’s ability to combat a pandemic or WMD attack centers on an identifiable capacity 
that is necessary to sustain various capabilities — laboratory testing, epidemiology, and 
disease surveillance. This capacity is also tied directly to the strategic objectives 
contained in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.224 The focus of reforming the 
DHS Grant Program to improve capacity building initiatives is on reforming the grant 
system itself — not homeland security capacity building. Although the ultimate end-state 
is to have a grant program that effectively supports targeted capacity building efforts, the 
focus of the department’s efforts is on the immediacy of “fixing a problem” versus 
realizing expanded or sustained capacities that are tied directly to strategic goals. 
Additionally, focusing on the immediacy of a problem leads to a shorter, versus longer-
term, focus that aims to achieve a desired goal. 
 
2. Challenges 
a. Nature of Costs 
A homeland security capacity building definition aimed at improving the 
organizational capacities of key program areas to increase efficiencies and streamline 
critical processes that support homeland security has different sorts of costs than a 
definition centering on the expansion or revitalization of critical systems. The nature of 
costs in this case are that they not front-loaded in nature, but rather are spread and 
increased over time. For example, there have been numerous attempts to improve and                                                  
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reform the U.S. government grant allocation process since the 1960s. Despite some 
successes at reform, consolidation, and streamlining of key programs, the system as a 
whole has becoming increasingly more complex and fragmented. The nature of “doing 
business” has also increased over time. Additional layers of bureaucracy, the inclusion of 
administrative clauses into grants that are not directly tied to the grant’s purpose, and 
laborious grant processing have increased the price of doing business in terms of 
monetary, temporal, and administrative resources. 
Because the DHS Grant System is a product of a flawed grant process, its 
relative newness to tackling a difficult mission area, and the other issues affecting its 
performance — oversight, fiscal discipline, and difficulty in assessing the numbers, types 
of capabilities, and targeting specific areas — there has been very little discussion on 
opportunity costs. This is directly tied to the absence of trade-offs in the federal budget. 
The DHS Grant System’s inability to ascertain whether resources are being expended in 
high priority and focused areas according to an overall strategy results in an inability to 
translate and weigh investment proposals within a wider context. Unlike the National 
Defense Education Act, where President Eisenhower and Congress understood the need 
for a simple, stable, and effective grant system to stimulate targeted growth, the present 
system falls short of this ideal. As a result, there is very little debate on decisions being 
made today and how they affect the sustainment of homeland security over the long-term. 
 
b. Political Acceptability 
Political acceptability is less of a challenge with this form of a capacity 
building interpretation. Without significant front-loaded cost issues to address, there is 
very little consideration to longer term effects. In general, federal, state, and local 
jurisdictions are focused on current and short-term fiscal year appropriations. 
Additionally, a homeland security capacity building definition centered on reforming and 
streamlining key programs that are integral to the homeland security mission focuses on 
reform and transformation issues — issues which resonate significantly in both political 
parties. The problem is that these reform initiatives have typically not taken hold nor 
have they fundamentally altered or transformed the nature of doing business. A homeland 
security capacity building definition, however, that would focus on the recapitalization of 
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critical systems tied directly to an overarching strategy would bring a debate over 
opportunity costs and trade-offs directly to the forefront. 
The issue of transforming government and streamlining the government’s 
grant allocation process is indeed a strategic and arguably more significant issue than 
implementing an effective homeland security strategy. The price of doing business with 
regards to grants and transfer of government funds has increased and grown more 
complex since the 1960s. Direct grants to local and private recipients have also changed 
the federal nature of the system at the expense of the states. The fundamental question is 
whether an all encompassing federal grant system supports prudent fiscal decisions that 
foster disciplined decisions.225 This debate is much larger than homeland security. 
For the purposes of developing a homeland security capacity building 
definition that is directly tied to improving mechanisms and practices in support of the 
overarching strategy, the focus on key programs — while an important issue — is more 
of a support function that constitutes part of the enabling environment.226 The grant 
program constitutes one of many policy tools that can be used to support or enable 
growth. It does not constitute a sound definition for capacity building, because it does not 
capture the wider underlying issues of building, strengthening, and sustaining key 
homeland security capacities that are vital to realizing an envisioned end-state. It also 
does not bring forth the trade-off decisions and opportunity costs in terms of weighing 
short-term commitments and long-term consequences. 
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V. FOCUSING ON KEY HOMELAND SECURITY MANNING 
ISSUES: THE NECESSITY FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND OTHER TRAINING INITIATIVES 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
TRAINING 
1. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: A Key Example  
The last homeland security capacity building alternative is to focus on measures 
that seek to improve and expand professional development, training, and education 
opportunities for those engaged in the homeland security mission to better understand, 
prevent, and respond to threats. These professional development and training programs 
can range from formalized schools and training centers to individual instruction or 
symposiums. The development of homeland security training programs focuses on 
equipping individuals with the necessary skills to understand the mission, the challenges 
to successful implementation, and achieving better preparedness. 
The homeland security mission is wide and varied. The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security outlines six mission areas. As a review, they are: Intelligence and 
Warning, Border and Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting 
Critical Infrastructure, Defending against Catastrophic Threats, and Emergency 
Preparedness and Response.227 Developing professional development, education, and 
training opportunities to meet a varied and complex mission is a difficult undertaking — 
particularly when many of the homeland security mission functions lie outside the DHS 
or even the federal government. 
Despite its complexity, education, training, and professional development has 
been identified as a key area within the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The 
development of a national training and evaluation system is listed as a major initiative 
under the strategy, which recognizes up front that there exists a strain on “the nation’s 
system for training its emergency response personnel.”228 Outlined in the strategy is an 
initiative to meet this demand through consolidating requirements at the DHS and 
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developing standards via the Emergency Management Institute, the Center for Domestic 
Preparedness, and the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium under a train-the-
trainer concept. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated some of the education and 
training responsibilities under the DHS. One example was the transfer of the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) located in Glynco, Georgia.229 The FLETC in 
conjunction with its satellite campuses offers a range of courses on a wide range of topics 
such as federal air marshal training to explosive forensics. It serves as the primary law 
enforcement training center for federal agencies. It also provides state and local outreach 
opportunities for specialized courses on a space available basis.230 
The ability of the FLETC to train students is one example among the many 
training initiatives needed to support the homeland security strategy. In response to 9/11, 
the FLETC increased its student week to 6-days, allowing for a student enrollment 
increase of 20 percent.231 From 2002 to 2005, the FLETC has been able to increase its 
student throughput by approximately 48 percent.232 Most notably, however, for FY2005 
approximately 17 percent of the students trained were from state and local jurisdictions 
— bringing into question whether outreach efforts beyond the federal system are 
sufficient given that the majority of law enforcement and first responders are non-federal 
personnel.233 
A study conducted in 2003 found strains in capacity at the FLETC and its satellite 
campuses. This study identifies capacity as: 
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. . . the resources required, such as instructors, facilities, and equipment, to 
achieve the optimum level of training. Its measurement depends upon the 
following factors: type of operation schedule (e.g., 5-day/8-hour 
schedule), the campus (e.g., Glynco), the time frame (e.g., a given fiscal 
year), and special considerations (e.g., changes in training priority, 
mission, or policy).234 
 
The study identified several aspects of capacity strains. The first stemmed from 
the assumption that all the facilities, instructors, and equipment would be available for 
training students. As the study differentiates, however, “capacity is ultimately a function 
of facilities, instructors, and equipment that are actually available to provide training at a 
point in time.235 As the study further outlined, the significant choke points were the strain 
on facilities, shortage and availability of instructors, and the dimensions of physical 
student throughput whether through messing and berthing facilities. Another choke point 
originated from increasing the student week from five to six day per week. This increase 
affected the quality of instruction, student attrition, instructor workload overload, and the 
affect on maintenance due to increased use.236 
The FLETC example illustrates some capacity shortfalls and required outcomes 
that are consistent with the issues identified with the Laboratory Response Network and 
the underlying concepts offered by Hayes, Pisano, and Upton who define capacity 
cushion as “the amount of capacity in excess of expected demand.” 237 A capacity 
consisting of instructor personnel, equipment, facilities, and student throughput 
components all possess attributes that are identifiable and that have finite qualities. At a 
strategic level, determining how much capacity exists across the wide breadth of 
homeland security mission areas and whether such capacities — consistent with the 
national approach of the strategy — can accommodate state, local, and private entities 
drives the investment decisions and mitigating strategies that are required to address 
capacity cushion shortfalls, the assessment of sustainment costs, and the analysis of 
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trade-offs. These issues intuitively lie at the center of homeland security capacity 
building initiatives and are consistent with the strategic challenges and the sorts of 
decisions faced by General Marshall and President Eisenhower. These capacity building 
decisions belong at the forefront of homeland security strategic planning efforts and 
center on the necessary steps that envision success. Grant programs and other enabling 
environment policy tools play an important, but supportive role that foster the capacity 
building decisions necessary to fulfill the strategy. 
 
2. Homeland Security Professional Development and Training 
Challenges 
The FLETC challenges represent one point amongst a wider set of issues. Despite 
the education and training intent in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, several 
other challenges exist to implementing such an undertaking. The first challenge deals 
with the wide scope of the mission. Homeland security includes several elements of the 
federal government, numerous state and local entities, and private organizations that 
perform a fundamental role in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. Many of 
these organizations, such as public health, have little to no experience in working with 
law enforcement or other personnel. Second, there is little prior history for homeland 
security training initiatives. The DHS was created after 9/11, and the attempts to provide 
training to first responders and consequence management officials during the 1990s were 
disjointed and uncoordinated.238 For example, the DoD’s commitment to conducting 
training under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act was tepid and “a distraction from the core 
mission of war-fighting.”239 Lastly, there is a limited strategic impetus that seeks to 
address and integrate the training and education mechanisms, which support a wide 
variety of programs and mission sets. 
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A symposium held in December 2003 by the National Academy of Public 
Administration outlined many of the issues dealing with the practical management of 
homeland security. Of significance, the symposium identified three issues, which are 
symptoms of challenges outlined above: 
• Lack of common understanding on functions, goals, and outcomes 
• Lack of capacity to be effective partners 
• Planning identified as the “Achilles Heel” of Homeland Security.240 
As outlined in the report: “During any sweeping governmental reorganization, 
considerable misinformation, confusion, and misunderstanding are not only likely, but 
are to be expected.”241 The lack of common understanding on functions, goals, and 
outcomes, however, is also a consequence of the disjointed domestic preparedness 
training approach that occurred during the 1990’s. As Richard Falkenrath states: 
[T]he specifics of the program’s development [domestic preparedness 
programs] have been dominated by the fragmented politics of federal 
budget process. The program that took shape was the result of a series of 
uncoordinated legislative earmarks, which permitted a succession of 
relatively minor programmatic initiatives in individual federal agencies. 
Once established, these programs became the objects of uneasy 
collaborations between individual legislators and executive branch 
agencies, which allowed the programs to grow to their present proportions. 
It was, in other words, a “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” process, with 
no guiding strategy, concept, or program architecture.242 
 
Although training has been highlighted as a key area under the present strategy, 
the current issue with domestic preparedness deals with the emphasis on table-top 
exercises where exercise participants simulate various scenarios and actions. There is 
very little practical emphasis on utilizing the equipment and communications that would 
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actually be used in a response.243 While table-top exercises provide valuable training to 
examine responses, identify coordination shortfalls, and catalogue lessons, practical 
training that emphasizes realistic integration across a wide set of first responders is 
necessary. 
The second issue identified in the National Academy’s report highlights the fact 
that many jurisdictions lack the capacity to be effective partners. Some jurisdictions lack 
the specific skills, whether through shortfalls in specific law enforcement capabilities, 
varying levels of public health capacity, or emergency management skills.244 
Compounding this issue is the inability of state and local jurisdictions to train and equip 
enough personnel in sufficient numbers.245 This feedback is consistent with the levels of 
state and local participation at the FLETC in Glynco, Georgia. 
Lastly, homeland security planning was identified as the “Achilles Heel” of the 
overall effort. The shortfalls contained in the report centered on two issues — the need to 
foster planning efforts through “technical assistance and training, sharing of federal 
physical and human assets or eligibility for performance-based funding, for example to 
stimulate effective planning across regions,” and the need to develop a comprehensive 
inventory of capabilities cutting across local, state, and federal organizations.246 Planning 
is both an acquired skill with discrete methodologies and a collaborative exercise with all 
stakeholders participating in the plan’s development phase. As a result, effective planning 
requires supportive training and assistance as well as a venue that brings together 
different participants to develop the plan. One of the criticisms from state and local 
constituencies on the National Strategy for Homeland Security was the lack of 
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participation in the development of the strategy.247 An overarching strategy that requires 
state, local, and private buy-in to successfully implement may fail to achieve the National 
Preparedness Goal, especially with planned reductions in homeland security funding.248 
Homeland security training and education faces many challenges. As highlighted 
by the FLETC example, notable capacity strains exist in current facilities. Throughput 
considerations are not only unique to the FLETC. Another example is the Center for 
Domestic Preparedness (CDP) in Anniston, Alabama. The CDP is the only facility in the 
nation chartered to train civilian first responders in a real-live chemically toxic 
environment.249 At an optimum throughput capacity, the center can process about 10,000 
students per year.250 It also typically has 5,000 applicants on its waiting list.251 Individual 
jurisdictions also have varying degrees of capabilities and skills. This was evidenced in 
the 2001 Anthrax attacks. The CDC had to deploy tailored support teams to meet 
individual requirements. Lastly, planning is more than conducting exercises. It is a skill 
and a collaborative activity. As such, it requires training to instruct and improve planning 
methodologies as well as venues to effectively implement. 
 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY MANNING ISSUES: STRATEGIC 
CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Mechanisms 
The homeland security training and education enterprise needs its underlying 
mechanisms to fall under a clear and concise training strategy that is founded on a 
regional and enterprise-wide basis. Similar to the U.S. Army’s efforts prior to the Second 
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World War, the homeland security enterprise led by the DHS needs to unify its linkages 
to industry and technology, develop its schools through a combination of technical and 
professional training, and enhance its training feedback assessment systems.252 It also 
needs to bring its efforts in working with civilian academic institutions, state, and local 
partners as part of a greater and focused strategy. 
There are several ways to frame a training strategy to man and equip homeland 
security professionals with the required skills they need. The first method recognizes that 
there are several levels and types of education. As Altizer and others point out, there are 
training and mentoring programs, experiential learning, and formal education.253 The aim 
of these different types of training is to ensure technical expertise in particular fields of 
discipline while broadening an individual’s scope and experience as they progress. These 
levels account for end-to-end professional development. 
The DHS and other departments of the federal government possess numerous 
training facilities and assistance programs aimed at training homeland security 
professionals. The issue — unlike the U.S. Army’s training mandate in the Second World 
War — is that no single organization is responsible or has insight into the various 
programs. This leads to excessive duplication and waste.254 Additionally, there is no 
corresponding strategic insight into the capacity strains that exist, shortfalls in 
throughput, required investment decisions to expand, or an assessment whether the 
current capacity of the homeland security training enterprise can actually fulfill the 
targeted levels contained in the National Preparedness Goal, the TCL, and other 
strategies. 
Homeland security is a new field that encompasses many broad areas. 
Experiential learning afforded by internships, fellowships, and partnerships with industry 
and think-tanks allows individuals to expand their experience and knowledge into areas 
that can support homeland security missions.255 The essential element for the DHS is to 
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harness these efforts under a unified approach that is consistent with the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security.256 Interagency coordination and oversight are key 
elements in harnessing a broad collaboration strategy to support homeland security.257 
A government emphasis on orchestrating a strategic approach, similar to the 
Eisenhower National Defense Education Act, is recognized as an essential element to 
preserving the nation’s innovative skills. The need for a similar initiative was recognized 
and included key recommendations, to include increases in fellowships that support the 
DHS, other agencies, and federal investment.258 The New National Defense Education 
Act of 2006 was introduced into the Congress for debate in February 2006.259 Similar to 
the Eisenhower initiative, this bill seeks to harness the nation’s academic and research 
base to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. It is essential to the homeland 
security enterprise that the DHS leverage these initiatives to support the mission. 
Integrating this strategic initiative into homeland security will greatly increase 
professional development efforts and foster the skills necessary to successfully 
implement the strategy. 
The second method to approaching training balances the need for different levels 
of education and training with the unique and broad nature of the homeland security 
mission. It recognizes the need for combining overarching training, experiential, and 
professional initiatives with approaching training on a regional basis. Homeland security 
training needs vary between regions, which possess different critical infrastructures, 
populations, and trans-border issues.260 Regionalized training centers focused on meeting 
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individual needs to train, equip, and exercise homeland security professionals and 
tailored to meet the necessary capacities can foster federal and non-federal interaction 
across multi-disciplinary fields.261 A combination of regional training centers and 
computer-based and distance learning training can improve access to state and local 
communities that require training specific to their needs. Ideally, the regional training 
approach should be consistent with any initiative to regionalize the DHS enterprise or to 
integrate the training system with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) regions. 
 
2. Measuring Progress 
Measuring training progress, credentials, training capacities, and system 
throughputs will be difficult if they are not cross-linked and if a regional and national — 
federal, state, local — approach is not developed. A regional training approach combined 
with different levels of professional development — training, experiential, and academic 
— would require a substantive commitment and mobilization of resources. Such an effort 
can be accomplished. The Eisenhower National Defense Education Act was such a 
strategic initiative and one without precedent until its enactment. 
There has also been a recent and similar initiative that required federal, state, and 
local integration. The nation mobilized its resources and commitment as part of a focused 
effort to address the Y2K issue.262 This effort affected all governmental and private 
activities, resulted in the development of public-private venues to foster collaboration, 
and utilized extensive enabling environment policy tools to accomplish the necessary 
tasks.263 Similar to the Y2K effort, an enterprise homeland security approach that seeks 
to address training needs, capacities, and integration at all levels of government requires 
the ability to measure the attainment of preparedness goals, readiness, and objectives that 
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are tied to a defined end-state.264 Falkenrath’s recommendation for developing a 
statistical measurement of preparedness that incorporates training levels, equipment, and 
other capabilities would allow homeland security leaders to track chokepoints and 
progress while identifying baseline levels of preparedness across regions.265 
The development of a homeland security enterprise approach that trains and 
educates the wide array of professionals is dependent on two variables. First, it is 
dependent on a strategy that integrates the various elements of the enterprise. 
Regionalization of training offers one solution to the integration challenge. The second 
variable is the assessment of the underlying capacity issues that presently exist, 
identifying which areas need to be revitalized and those that can be eliminated. These 
variables need to be linked into a focused effort, similar to Y2K, which supports an 
envisioned end-state. 
Enabling environment tools must also be crafted and modified for a successful 
strategy to work. The shortfalls to the DHS Grant System have already been addressed. 
Other enabling issues are also pertinent to integration. Memorandums of Agreement, 
legal reviews, and mutual assistance contracts have to be modified and changed to 
accommodate regional training and manning approaches. At the federal level, integration 
issues — particularly between the DHS and the DoD — are key areas of concern. For 
example, the National Guard by its very nature is federal, state, and local. The Army and 
Air National Guard are deeply embedded throughout the country, possess unique skills 
that can be used for homeland security, and operate facilities that can be leveraged to 
support other homeland security elements.266 By its nature, the military can rapidly 
mobilize and project capabilities with requisite command, control, and communications 
to support all-hazard scenarios.267 The issue is one of integration. The DoD has typically 
been reluctant to involve itself in domestic settings. Additionally, the request for 
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assistance process for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is controlled at the 
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD).268 This contributed to poor coordination and 
delays in military support during Hurricane Katrina.269 Combined planning, training, and 
enterprise approaches to homeland security and defense mission can overcome these 
delays and contribute to more focused solutions. 
Underlying training capacity issues also need to be assessed. The concept of 
capacity building centers on first knowing the baseline condition of a system. Once 
determined, a capacity building approach through the identification of capacity needs 
assessments should address the question: “Capacity for what?”270 The underlying 
capacity challenges identified in the FLETC and CDP examples offer some insight into 
the requirements that need assessing. A determination of capacity strains, chokepoints, 
training throughput, and sustainment issues would require an assessment at the strategic 
level. These capacity challenges are consistent with capacity assessments performed in 
the academic community. A coherent capacity strategy in the academic realm 
acknowledges the need for a unifying strategy tied to measurable outcomes while giving 
local administrators the flexibility to adjust teaching methods to achieve goals.271 It also 
acknowledges the need for assessing individual capacities — instructor knowledge, 
professional development opportunities, student environment, and the quality of the 
curriculum and organizational capacities — the amount of personnel and skills required 
to support the school environment and linkages with other communities.272 
The assessment of underlying capacity issues is also dependent on the mission 
and responsibilities of the individual organizations. The National Strategy for Homeland 
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Security pays particular focus to preparation and response efforts against a catastrophic 
WMD attack.273 As Falkenrath points out, a WMD attack is a high consequence/low 
probability event. Other terrorist activities, however, are of lower consequence but higher 
probability.274 A strategy that seeks to train all first responders in WMD attack 
mitigation techniques would be cost prohibitive — particularly for state and local 
jurisdictions. A more reasonable approach would be to assign primary WMD 
responsibilities to the National Guard in order to absorb the more expensive capacity 
cushion and sustainment costs. The alignment of organizational responsibilities with 
mission sets consistent with their roles and capabilities can also serve and rationalize the 
response and recovery process. The implementation of such a policy would require a 
trade-off and strategic policy analysis as well as streamlining the adjudication of support 
between federal departments. The military may also lack some of its traditional 
capabilities due to recurring commitments overseas.275 Because of these commitments, 
any of the mutual agreements between states for use of National Guard forces “may not 
ensure that capabilities will meet requirements, because it draws from a force pool that is 
already overtaxed.”276 
The development of a comprehensive and long-range strategy that addresses the 
shortfalls in homeland security training for the variety of its mission areas requires an 
approach that addresses training, practical experience, and higher education. It also 
requires an enterprise approach that incorporates the various agencies of the federal, state, 
local governments and private organizations. Additionally, individual and organizational 
capacities, determination of baselines, and capacity needs assessments must be tied to an 
articulated and clear vision. The enabling environment, through the integration of grants, 
mutual aid agreements, and changes to procedures — particularly between federal 
agencies such as the DHS and DoD — are also necessary to achieving success under a 
unified vision. Lastly, due to the fragmented nature of approaching domestic 
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preparedness, a comprehensive analysis of alternatives, trade-offs, and policy reviews are 
necessary to revalidate planning assumptions and capacity cushion considerations. 
 
C. HOMELAND SECURITY MANNING ISSUES: CAPACITY BUILDING? 
1. Implications 
A review of various homeland security manning issues identifies several 
concerns. The first concern highlights the fragmented nature of domestic preparedness 
strategies. This fragmented approach is due to the weak foundations that arose from U.S. 
government efforts in the 1990s. This has resulted in numerous overlapping programs, 
weak linkages between federal training systems and non-federal entities, and poor 
strategies that fail to consider cross-disciplinary and multi-mission training efforts. While 
training and properly manning homeland security professionals are identified as 
important goals under the national strategy, there have been limited attempts at 
developing and integrating an enterprise architecture to meet these goals. 
The second concern stems from the present fragmentation. It is difficult to assess 
at the strategic level existing shortfalls, excesses, or fundamental baselines in homeland 
security manning and training. The answers to these questions exist at different levels, 
usually at the individual level as seen in the FLETC or CDP examples. They are not 
integrated to offer a broad look across federal, state, and local organizations. This lack of 
feedback and assessment makes it difficult, if not impossible, to derive benchmarks and 
assign indicators of progress. 
The last concern deals with long-range sustainment. Fragmentation and poor 
assessment and feedback mechanisms prohibit long-range considerations for adjustments 
in training, an analysis of trade-offs, or changes in training to meet new threat 
considerations. Training overlap and narrow versus integrated approaches to addressing 
these issues will contribute to wasteful spending and poor investment strategies. These 
factors will directly contribute to homeland security sustainment shortfalls. 
Homeland security manning and training considerations have a direct role in 
supporting the elements of the national strategy. Rationalizing these considerations under 
a unified vision that institutes an enterprise-approach with broad stakeholder buy-in is 
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fundamental to sustaining homeland security efforts. Manning and training for homeland 
security are consistent with the capacity building attributes identified in General 
Marshall’s 90-Division Gamble and President Eisenhower’s National Defense Education 
Act. Manning and training for homeland security also: 
• Focus on the strategic and the long-term 
• Require a substantive or recognized commitment to expand or preserve 
• Require knowledge of the end-to-end capacity linkages that produce 
specific capabilities — infrastructure, training base, logistics — to 
understand opportunity costs and trade-off decisions 
• Contain material and social aspects 
• Tie directly to sustainment 
A comparison between the issues identified for homeland security manning and training 
and the Laboratory Response Network also reveals similar consistencies. They are both 
directly tied to accomplishing the mission. The investment decisions are also front-ended 
and tied to sustainment. They also bring forth the concept of capacity building in that 




a. Nature of Costs 
The development of a unified approach and the creation of an enterprise-
architecture to address homeland security manning are similar to the costs identified in 
the Laboratory Response Network. Manning and equipping the various elements of 
homeland security would be expensive undertakings.277 The identification of duplicative 
efforts, unnecessary programs, the leveraging of resources across governmental lines, and 
new training approaches can cut some of these costs. 
The costs associated with developing an enterprise-training architecture 
and expanding the throughput mechanisms to train, equip, and man critical fields in 
homeland security is also a massive undertaking. It will require capital investment and 
                                                 
277 Carafano, “Homeland Security and the Trouble with Training,”9. 
98 
associated front-loaded costs to revamp facilities, create new regional centers, improve 
curricula, and account for increases in instructors and supporting staff. It will also require 
an integrated approach to address which elements will absorb more expensive capacity 
cushion costs. 
A capacity development approach to mature a homeland security manning 
and training strategy must also account for the diverse nature of the mission elements. It 
must also address the formulation of an accurate baseline, develop capacity needs 
assessments, and deconflict requirements that are using the same source for their needs 
— as evidenced by the back-order issue between the DHS and DoD. This capacity 
building approach should also account for changes to mission areas and new threats that 
develop over time. Like the considerations for the Laboratory Response Network, 
investment decisions and commitments represent a strategic decision point, 
implementation commitment, and risk. 
Inherent to this approach are the associated sustainment costs — the 
greatest area of concern. The importance of stability in capacity building development is 
recognized as a key factor to success.278 Lack of commitment by the federal government, 
administrative turnovers, attrition, continuing enabling environment shortfalls, and the 
lack of addressing realistic trade-offs in the budget will seriously hamper any efforts. 
 
b. Political Acceptability 
Like the Laboratory Response Network, revamping homeland security and 
domestic preparedness training efforts is a daunting task. Although previous external 
stimuli affected fundamental change — as seen in World War II or in the case of Sputnik 
— the approach to homeland security after 9/11 saw relatively little fundamental change 
or mobilization. The threat was more ambiguous than the Fascist or Soviet threats and the 
economic consequences were less acute.279 To embark on an expensive undertaking 
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would require an assessment of trade-offs and changes to strategic policy. This  
also represents a significant opportunity cost. 
Developing an enterprise-architecture and strategy would also require 
extensive buy-in from political parties, entrenched bureaucracies, and a variety of other 
public and private stakeholders. The enactment of this form of capacity building would 
also require significant changes to the enabling environment — not an easy proposition to 
change or effect. During the Second World War and the Sputnik crisis, there was a 
greater consensus to building common approaches aimed at mobilizing the nation. Those 
sets of circumstances do not seem to exist as readily today. 
A capacity building definition that defines homeland security efforts as — 
The U.S. government will engage in capacity building measures to improve and expand 
homeland security training and planning skills to equip professionals with the skills to 
understand, prevent, and respond to homeland security threats — requires the integration 
of disparate elements of several layers of government and private entities. It also requires 
a solid buy-in from varying elements that may possess differing agendas. This capacity 
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VI. CONCLUSION: CAPACITY BUILDING AND 
IDENTIFYING THE END-STATE 
A. CAPACITY BUILDING: RELATIONSHIP TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
“. . . it is likely that our all our actions will promote the profit and advantage of the 
state.” — Xenophon280 
 
1. Capacity Building and the Envisioned End-state: Linkages 
The strategic environment in the twenty-first century is characterized by 
numerous challenges — global technological access and development, the determined 
threat posed by international terrorism, and the proliferation of WMD.281 These new 
challenges have redefined the concept of risk. Despite the rising concerns of these risks 
during the 1990s, it was the attacks on 9/11 that fundamentally brought forth the need and 
urgency to meet these challenges. Numerous strategies have been developed since 9/11 to 
address these challenges — many addressing wider non-military issues such as cyber 
defense or combating terrorist financing. 
Homeland security leaders and planners can lose sight of envisioned goals given 
the proliferation of strategic challenges, new strategies, and directives, many of which 
may seem to compete with one another. It is also understandable for organizations 
attempting to meet these challenges to focus on shorter-term problems and lose sight of 
the envisioned goals.282 Given numerous realignments, reorganizations, and new 
missions, it is also easy to misunderstand the use of the term strategy. Angelo Codevilla 
and Paul Seabury, however, offer a simple definition. They state: “Strategy is a fancy 
word for a road map for getting from here to there, from the situation at hand to the 
situation one wishes to attain.”283 A homeland security strategy should address the 
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present situation and the envisioned end-state that needs to be attained within the larger 
concept of the nation’s Grand Strategy.284 
One critique of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is that it contains 
numerous descriptions of major mission areas, outlines goals and initiatives, and includes 
suggested policies and objectives, yet falls short of “connecting the dots in a way that 
conveys a strategy.285 To utilize Codevilla and Seabury’s definition of strategy, the 
critique suggests that that the National Strategy for Homeland Security falls short of what 
is to be attained. In other words, the envisioned end-state is not defined. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 8 (National Preparedness) 
explicitly states that preparedness efforts are integral to preparing the nation in terms of 
resiliency and sustainment. It also introduces the concept of capacity building as it relates 
to “activities such as information gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration 
related to terrorist attacks.”286 The central premise is that capacity building strategies 
focused on expanding and sustaining key areas is the underlying principle and critical 
component to an effective preparedness program.287 Capacity building strategies should 
define the necessary actions, outline measures to achieve preparedness, and define a way 
ahead to achieve these goals while consistent with the desired end-state or envisioned 
goal. Despite the language contained in HSPD-8, there is no corresponding strategic 
approach that describes a capacity building strategy from its present situation to the one 
that needs to be attained in terms of national preparedness. Equating federal assistance to 
capacity building and implementing a strategy via a flawed system of grants ensure 
potential resources will be distributed in a non-targeted and inefficient manner. 
Additionally, annual grant announcements and competition for resources via a grant 
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process does not connote a strategy that illuminates a road-map of success. It 
institutionally reinforces a shorter-term focus and promotes continued raids of the fiscal 
commons. This phenomenon brings into question the ability to sustain targeted efforts 
over the long-term. 
As highlighted in capacity building literature: “The mere existence of a capacity 
building strategy or policy document to which senior officials have put the government’s 
name is not necessarily an indication of real commitment.”288 A capacity building 
strategy requires that the term be defined and a corresponding decision within the context 
of homeland security be made to answer: “Capacity for what?”289 Additionally, 
achieving preparedness “is not an end unto itself, but rather an intermediate objective.”290 
Capacity building strategies aimed at achieving preparedness must be linked with the 
ultimate objectives and an end-state envisioned for homeland security. 
A notable military strategist, Colin Gray, once stated that for strategic success in 
the military “forces must be internally coherent, which is to say competently joint, be of a 
quantity and provide a strategic effect scaled to the tasks set by high policy, and be 
employed coercively in pursuit of military objectives that fit political goals.”291 
Arguably, General Marshall’s decisions to properly scope and train the U.S. Army during 
the Second World War within the larger strategic context contributed to the nation’s 
success. To contrast, the lack of sufficient staff, epidemiologists, and physical capacity 
hampered the Laboratory Response Network’s ability to fulfill its mission. In other 
words, the network lacked the coherency, quantity, and quality to achieve a strategic 
effect. A capacity building strategy tied to a clear idea of success while properly 
considering trade-offs and opportunity costs can achieve that strategic effect. 
For the nation’s present homeland security challenges, the ability to address the 
coherence of disparate federal, state, and local capabilities in terms of competency, to 
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determine the quantity that is needed, and to employ these capabilities in pursuit of 
homeland security objectives lies at the center of a capacity building strategy. Defining 
capacity building and addressing which areas require emphasis represents the initial point 
of departure for strategic planning. 
Incorporating the capacity building definitions as outlined in the Laboratory 
Response Network and homeland security manning examples to define capacity building 
as “increasing investment in specific areas to recapitalize critical systems and improve 
and expand training and planning skills for areas that support homeland security efforts” 
sharpens the initial investment considerations and decision-making necessary to identify 
which areas require focus and how to implement major and fundamental change. It also 
brings forth the opportunity costs and the trade-off decisions to support and scope the 
strategy. Utilizing a capacity building definition that provides greater coherence begins to 
address such issues as the 34,000 positions that are required annually to support the 
foreign language skills of more than 65 federal agencies or the need to fill and sustain 
15,000 new employees that are required to support public health functions.292 Addressing 
these sorts of issues up front requires specific decisions on which languages are more 
critical than others, which public health functions require more investment over other 
functions, and the measures that are necessary to sustain these initiatives. Answering 
these challenges leads to addressing the appropriate means that are necessary to begin 
achieving the objectives and eventually, the envisioned end-state. To adopt a capacity 
building definition that is based on the disbursement of grants does not immediately 
highlight these decisions and “ignores the larger point that the system for disbursing 
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2. Capacity Building versus Capability Based Approaches 
The terms capability and capacity building have been used interchangeably and 
have been part of the public discourse for a long time.294 These terms are also confused 
in homeland security. Both terms are similar in that they address preparedness and 
sustainment issues. A capability — an activity that must be performed through 
combination of resources to achieve a goal — addresses the specific measures and 
resource management issues to develop and implement discrete functions.295 For 
example, many jurisdictions require a capability to mitigate the effects of a WMD. 
Capability-based planning offers a methodology to identify, develop, and sustain these 
discrete functions consistent with meeting particular mission tasks. 
As outlined in this thesis, a capacity building approach requires a broader and 
more strategic approach in terms of mobilization, scope, and sustainment. Capacity 
building for homeland security must focus on wiser investment decisions, trade-off 
considerations, and opportunity costs. Capacity building approaches must also address 
the underlying and foundational aspects of supporting and sustaining strategic homeland 
security initiatives. Capacity building is not necessarily focused on specific capabilities, 
but seeks to reconcile the support of various capabilities through expanding broader 
foundational systems and wider training programs with the enabling environment — 
governance issues, society, economics, and organizations. 
In terms of homeland security, capability-based planning and a capacity building 
approach are both necessary. Greater focus has been placed on defining and planning for 
capabilities. Arguably, greater consideration must be given to identifying the underlying 
structures and means necessary to support wider strategic and capacity building 
initiatives to sustain homeland security over the long-term. Upon closer inspection, 
focusing on capabilities development is a necessary, but more narrowly focused activity 
to meet specific mission objectives. Conversely, a capacity building approach 
incorporates a broader set of issues. Both concepts are necessary and linked, but both are 
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different and seek to address different issues. The relationship between the two, the end-
state and the enabling environment is illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Strategy Relationship from Enabling Environment to the End-State 
 
Guided by the varying levels of strategy — whether first, second, or third tier plans, 
homeland security capability-based planning and capacity building approaches should 
seek to directly support the envisioned end-state for homeland security. These actions 
complement one another to produce the specific capabilities that are necessary to reduce 
risk and uncertainty. The development of capabilities is more closely tied to homeland 
security’s end-state — the specific skills and measurable tasks that support the envisioned 
goal. As seen in other literature, capacity building strategies encompass broader 
applications and are dependent on linkages that constitute the enabling environment — 
governance structures, organizations, and wider societal issues — and galvanize and 
sustain efforts over the long-term. While capabilities-based planning focuses on shorter-
term issues, both methodologies, focus on the long-term challenges and in concert, 
should seek to identify and sustain the overall strategy to meet homeland security 
objectives. The National Strategy for Homeland Security should provide the vision and 
illuminate the way to achieving the end-state while linking these various concepts in an 
integrated and coherent manner. 
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B. CAPACITY BUILDING: INVESTING FOR THE LONG-TERM 
“When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing 
would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to.” 
       — John Stuart Mill296 
 
1. Capacity Assessment: Initial Point of Departure 
Pursing homeland security initiatives as part of a wider strategy requires a 
concerted effort to identify critical capacities and a capacity assessment of the present 
areas that require focus. This is particularly important given that the homeland security 
strategy falls within a wider context of the nation’s grand strategy. The challenges facing 
the Laboratory Response Network and the broader homeland security manning and 
training issues offer several points for consideration. As noted, despite the efforts of the 
CDC during the 1990s to develop the Laboratory Response Network, the 2001 Anthrax 
attacks revealed that the network could not meet the demand for processing clinical and 
environmental samples. There remained a backlog of thousands of untested samples 
seven months after the attacks themselves.297 This shortfall in capacity was essentially a 
throughput issue. 
For homeland security training, the FLETC example highlighted the challenges to 
meeting the increased demand for training a wider audience of related homeland security 
professionals — including state and local representatives. Capacity strains as evidenced 
by having to increase curriculum instruction, the increased use of facilities, and increased 
workload for instructors highlighted the shortcomings in the current system for training 
homeland security professionals. It also brings into question the ability of the system to 
meet the envisioned target levels of capability under the current strategy. Simply put, a 
gap exists between the current throughputs of the FLETC versus the envisioned end-state 
of training homeland security professionals with the requisite skills and in sufficient 
numbers to meet future goals. 
Identifying critical capacities and measuring the ability of the current systems that 
support these capacities to meet homeland security objectives constitute the initial point 
of departure and the basis for capacity development. Prioritizing development needs                                                  
296 John Stuart Mill, The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The Subjection of Women & 
Utilitarianism (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), 234. 
297 Council on Foreign Relations, America Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger, 31. 
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should be tied directly to reducing fragility in those systems that require immediate 
attention.298 The ability to identify and prioritize, while probably the most difficult step, 
must be conducted within a national context, rather than a strictly federal approach in 
order to achieve wide buy-in from the disparate groups that are being asked to support the 
strategy. It is also a strategic implementation issue — the ability to reconcile an 
organization’s mission responsibilities with the personnel and equipment resources that it 
has been allocated. Levying multiple mission responsibilities without considering the 
resources that are assigned to an organization, similar to the Laboratory Response 
Network or the FLETC examples, will lead to a false assurance that the mission will be 
accomplished effectively. This is also a serious issue to consider, particularly with the 
multiple reorganizations, and the creation and assignment of new missions to 
intelligence, law enforcement, and military organizations since 9/11.299 Simply put, the 
plan might look sound, but in reality, a gap will exist between the expectations and what 
the organization can actually accomplish. 
Lastly, when considering that homeland security falls within a wider national 
grand strategy — military, economic, or foreign initiatives — the ability to identify and 
prioritize homeland security capacity building efforts also requires the ability to make 
difficult choices between alternatives. Current deficit spending leaves little flexibility to 
pursue ambitious initiatives across multiple fronts. As one report highlighted on the state 
of federal budget deficits, “by 2030 absent changes in the structure of Social Security and 
Medicare, there would be virtually no room for any other federal spending priorities, 
including national defense, education, and law enforcement.”300 Pursing homeland 
security capacity building initiatives, particularly given the difficulty in the identification 
and front-loaded nature of their costs, requires hard choices. 
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2. Capacity Cushion: How Much is Enough? 
Identification and prioritization of critical homeland security capacities also 
requires an assessment of, “How much is enough?” To use the Laboratory Response 
Network example, the initial estimate of the network’s capacity fell short of the 
unexpected demand for sampling. There was little flexibility to meet demand. Measuring 
how much capacity is required; particularly how much is required above normal 
operating conditions is the essential capacity cushion issue. Maintaining a capacity 
cushion might be a strategic necessity, but will likely be unpopular if a wide consensus is 
not achieved.  
Identifying duplication and cutting waste amongst homeland security entities and 
organizations at the federal, state, and local jurisdictions can streamline investment and 
rationalize capacity cushion issues. As one study outlined, “over 40 federal entities have 
roles in combating terrorism and, taken as a whole, past federal efforts often have 
resulted in a lack of accountability as well as gaps and duplication among programs.”301 
This duplication exists at all levels. Assigning specific missions and roles to particular 
organizations and having these entities assume capacity cushion costs can streamline and 
rationalize costs. For example, state and local jurisdictions may not have to invest large 
resources in WMD response capabilities if the National Guard assumed the 
preponderance of this mission. It would also mean, however, that the National Guard 
might have to limit its traditional war fighting proficiencies to better coordinate with 
varying levels of civilian government agencies.302 This example would in essence be a 
homeland security trade-off consideration within the larger and competing interests of 
grand strategy. 
Effectively addressing capacity cushion issues also requires an understanding of 
the dangers inherent to over mobilization. Similar to the challenge faced by General 
Marshall and the Victory Program, there is a danger of expending too many resources 
into specific areas and not enough in others. Identifying a middle ground requires 
flexibility in planning, an understanding of the present and changing nature of the threat, 
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and a reevaluation of the initial planning assumptions that were necessary to the 
formulation of the plan. It also requires an understanding of underlying resources and a 
flexibility to utilize existing capabilities to meet different mission sets. 
 
3. Developing Capacity Building Concepts: Envisioning the End-State 
An end-state is what is sought to be attained. As highlighted earlier, the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security has been criticized because it does not clearly define an 
end-state. Although the formulation of a homeland security end-state is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, its identification would better enable the implementation of effective 
homeland security capacity building strategies. To paraphrase Mill, if greater precision 
were given to our pursuit, we would have a better understanding of what the homeland 
security mission is trying to attain. A better understanding would support the strategic 
capacity building decisions that are necessary to achieve the end-state. 
Despite the absence of a precise or defined end-state, there are several elements 
that are required to ensuring effective capacity building concepts. First, is the importance 
of continuity. As Codevilla and Seabury highlight: “[S]trategy consists of a commitment 
to do whatever is necessary to make the plan work. This does not imply that once a plan 
is made it should be followed inflexibly. But it does imply the realization that to fight “on 
the cheap” either materially or politically is to court disaster.”303 The same holds true for 
long-term capacity building initiatives — the strategic means and commitment to 
implement and support the strategy. As evidenced by the U.S. Army’s efforts in the 
Second World War and President Eisenhower’s National Defense Education Act of 1958 
and the subsequent commitment by following administrations, continuity in planning and 
political buy-in are necessary to long-term capacity building effectiveness. 
Second, it is vital to maintain stability. Within the academic realm, building 
stability and rationalizing the grant system, contracts, and other incentives offered by 
governmental policy tools in the enabling environment are viewed as critical support 
components to an effective capacity building strategy.304 Similarly, an effective 
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homeland security capacity building strategy requires stability in order to be effective. 
The fragmentation, wasteful spending, overlap, and weak organizational oversight 
identified as part of the shortfalls in the DHS Grant System will continue to provide an 
unstable environment and eventually hamper any homeland security capacity building 
initiative. 
Lastly, if the intent of HSPD-8 is for the federal government to promote capacity 
building measures aimed to preparing varying levels of jurisdictions, then there must be 
incentives for jurisdictions to improve local capacities within a wider homeland security 
strategy. As one person stated: “Capacity is better spent on local problem solving than on 
seeking federal funds. In other words, attracting inputs is vital to organizational capacity, 
but, alone, it is an insufficient concept of capacity.”305 Simply disbursing funds that are 
not effectively aimed within a larger purpose misses the intent of capacity building. 
Incentives must be provided for state, local, and private entities in order for capacity 
building to be effective. Additionally, incentives will also support the longer-term 
sustainment of the overall strategy. Sound stakeholder identification, meaningful buy-in, 
and participation in the formulation of plans and initiatives are several methods of 
offering incentives. 
Defining homeland security capacity building, understanding the distinctions 
between capacity building and capability-based planning, and appreciating the inherent 
issues with developing a capacity building strategy — capacity assessments, capacity 
cushion, throughput, and strain issues — better captures the variables and the decisions 
that are necessary to implementing a coherent homeland security strategy. Linking 
capacity building to national strategy, investing in critical capacities, preserving and 
enhancing these capacities, and understanding the consequences of over mobilization also 
bring forth the sustainment challenges that are related to decision-making. The 
understanding of these issues and the implementation of homeland security capacity 
building approaches give the larger enterprise its purpose. It will also focus on attaining 
the envisioned end-state for homeland security. 
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